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Religion and Local Power
by Brian M. Miller*
I. INTRODUCTION
In December of 2017, hundreds of protestors descended on
Washington, D.C., from all over the United States. The crowds
converged on the blocks surrounding the Supreme Court of the United
States, where onlookers might have spotted signs reading “It’s Not
About the Cake,” and “Open to All,” rising from one side of the crowd,
and signs reading “Serves All People, But Can’t Create All Art,” and
“Justice for Jack” rising from the other side.1 That morning the
Supreme Court heard a case about a Colorado cake shop owner who,
because of his religious convictions, refused to create a cake that was to
be used at a wedding of two men.2 One small-scale business transaction
(or lack thereof) sparked protests and heated debate across the entire
country. Why?
The reasons are obvious to anyone familiar with United States
religious freedom jurisprudence. The Supreme Court was asked to
decide whether the United States Constitution gave Jack Phillips the
right to be exempt from a Colorado law that mandated he serve the
wedding cake to the gay couple.3 The Court’s answer to that question
not only would decide a dispute between one businessperson and one
couple, but also would set the tone for all future claims for religious
exemptions nationwide.
* North Carolina State University (B.A.). University of Virginia School of Law (J.D.,
2019). I thank Rich Schragger, Molly Brady, Jansen VanderMeulen, and W. Augustus
Todd for helpful comments. I also thank the editors of the Mercer Law Review for their
careful review and insightful suggestions.
1 Mark Sherman, et al., Protesters Gather as Supreme Court Wrestles With Case of
Wedding Cake for Same-Sex Couple, ABC 7 NEWS WJLA, Dec. 5, 2017,
https://wjla.com/news/local/protesters-outside-supreme-court-ahead-of-historic-case-onwedding-cake-for-gay-couple (last accessed June 20, 2020) (portraying the protests by
video).
2 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723
(2018).
3 Id.at 1723–24.
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Although the Supreme Court eventually decided the case on
narrower grounds than some commentators preferred,4 the Court has
historically ushered religious freedom issues from distinctly local
disputes to enshrinement in national law. In Trinity Lutheran Church
of Columbia v. Comer,5 one Christian school was not reimbursed by the
State of Missouri for resurfacing its playground, and after the Supreme
Court decision, all state or local entities potentially must fund religious
entities in the same way they fund nonreligious entities.6 In Everson v.
Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Tp.,7 one local school board was reimbursed for
the costs of bussing students to Catholic schools,8 and, after the
Supreme Court decided the case, the federal Establishment Clause
applied to every state and local government in the country.9
As anyone trying to trace a unifying thread through First
Amendment cases will understand, the Supreme Court’s religion
jurisprudence has historically been inconsistent and often unclear. At
least one thing is clear: for most of the major Supreme Court decisions
over recent decades implicating the First Amendment’s religion clauses,
likely a million or more people were encouraged and a million or more
were disheartened. That’s because whatever the decision, the newly
articulated legal principle controls every government within United
States borders.
Because of the far-reaching impact of such decisions, in the past few
decades seemingly no stone has remained unturned in the doctrine of
religious liberty. When is a person, or a corporation, entitled to an
exemption from a general law it claims burdens its religious exercise?10
When may government provide funding to a religious institution?11
When must it?12 May a town display a nativity scene in a public park at

4 See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV.
L. REV. 133, 133 (2018) (arguing that “the Court ducked central questions raised by [the
conflict in that case]. Rather than sorting out the principles for determining whether
religious liberty authorizes discrimination against gays and lesbians in the marketplace,
the Court focused on whether state officials treated religious objections with the proper
respect and consideration. The Court turned a matter of constitutional principle into one
of adjudicative etiquette.”).
5 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
6 Id. at 2021.
7 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
8 Id. at 3.
9 See id. at 15–16; Sch. Dist. of Abington Tp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 218 (1963)
(citing Everson for that rule).
10 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
11 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
12 See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2012.
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Christmas time?13 The list goes on, and the scholarship attempting to
answer such difficult questions is extensive and superb.14
Because of the distinctly national scale—thanks to the Supreme
Court’s approach—of these disputes, some commentators have sought
for an acceptable “compromise”; a rule or state of affairs that perhaps
does not give an outright win to any side but ultimately arrives at a
deal that a majority of people do not hate. For example, Andrew
Koppelman, in his recent book Gay Rights vs. Religious Liberty?, argues
for a national legislative compromise—one that contemplates strong
and broadly applicable nondiscrimination laws, but affords narrow
exemptions to entities that are open about their religious beliefs that
may require them to behave contrary to the general law.15
But perhaps the best compromise will not be found on the national
scale at all. What if there was a different type of “compromise” that
satisfied more people—one that gave a positively desirable result to a
large majority of citizens, not just as to the issue of religious
exemptions, but as to all issues implicating relations between religion
and government? Allowing local governments greater power and
freedom to chart their own course on matters of religion is, in my view,
that compromise. Yet, relatively little scholarly work has been done to
address whether government actions implicating the religion clauses
should be handled differently based on which government is involved.
Should a mayor’s Thanksgiving proclamation that gives thanks to Jesus
be treated by courts identically to the President’s Thanksgiving
proclamation which does the same? Should a federal law prohibiting
any federal funds from being distributed directly to religious entities be
treated the same as a local ordinance that prohibits such funding? In a
way, it is only natural that little attention has been given to such
questions of local power and diversity in the substantive area of
See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the
Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793 (2006)
(arguing that regulatory exemptions for religious practice do not violate the
Establishment Clause as it was originally understood); Micah Schwartzman, What if
Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351 (2012) (arguing that religion cannot be
distinguished from other sorts of beliefs and practices for special treatment); Nelson
Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263 (2008) (arguing that governments
should be able to selectively exclude religious entities from government support programs
without violating the Constitution).
15 ANDREW KOPPELMAN, GAY RIGHTS VS. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY?: THE UNNECESSARY
CONFLICT 11(2020) (“The response I develop here is to exempt only those who post
warnings about their religious objections, so that no customer would have the personal
experience of being turned away.”); see also id. at 64 (arguing that the proper form of
religious accommodation “could be done by statute, but not by judicial declaration”).
13
14
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religion. After all, both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause have applied to state and local governments for over seventy
years.16 Yet, granting the fact of incorporation, the Constitution does
not necessarily require that the religion clauses apply against local
governments in exactly the same way as they do against the federal
government and states.17
A couple scholars have begun to unpack this issue. In 2004, Richard
Schragger examined the nature of centralized versus dispersed political
power and their likely effects on individual liberty and concluded that
courts should give greater respect to local government actions affecting
religion, but direct greater suspicion toward federal government actions
that do so.18 More recently, Roderick Hills argued that because of the
breadth and intensity of disagreement on issues of religious freedom in
a nation as large and diverse as the United States, courts should defer
to states’ and localities’ stances on “reasonable and deep
disagreements”19—issues for which parties on both sides claim a
fundamental right to governmental support or accommodation.20 Under
both theories, local governments (and state governments, in Professor
Hills’s view) should have more leeway than the federal government to
either support or inhibit religion in the pursuit of the public good as
conceived by the majority of the jurisdiction’s citizens.
In recent years, unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not followed
a path like the one Professors Schragger and Hills have encouraged.21

16 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15–16 (applying the Establishment Clause to the states in
1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (applying the Free Exercise
Clause to the states in 1940).
17 See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THOMAS C. BERG, & CHRISTOPHER C. LUND, RELIGION
AND THE CONSTITUTION 73–75 (4th ed. 2016) (posing the question of whether normative
considerations might justify allowing local government entities more leeway under both
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses).
18 Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of
Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1811 (2004).
19
Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Federalism, Democracy, and Deep Disagreement:
Decentralizing Baseline Disputes in the Law of Religious Liberty, 69 ALA. L. REV. 913,
916–18 (2018).
20 Additionally, some scholars have argued that nationwide laws that limit local
discretion in certain areas brushing against religion are undesirable compared to
alternatives. See, e.g., Michael C. Pollack, Land Use Federalism’s False Choice, 68 ALA. L.
REV. 707, 727–29 (2017) (favoring “decision-channeling” federal rules, and disfavoring
“decision-displacing” rules, like those instituted by RLUIPA, in the context of national
land use regulation).
21 By this I mean that the Supreme Court has not followed an approach that allows
greater discretion to local governments than to other entities. Professors Schragger and
Hills do not argue for the exact same approach. Professor Schragger emphasizes local
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Particularly for free-exercise claims, it has likely, if anything, reduced
governmental discretion in general, including for local governments.22
This Article not only builds on Schragger’s and Hills’s theories, but
also (1) offers independent historical and theoretical justifications for
local power over church-state matters, and (2) closely inspects existing
church-state doctrine for bases from which to allow greater local
discretion. Specifically, it argues that local governments have
historically served as the best homes for democratic and associational
expression, and that this historical reality indeed reflects the values of
democratic theory more generally. It then explains why local
governments are especially effective at securing such values in the
context of religion. Within that framework, this Article moves to
critique modern Supreme Court doctrine as falling short of securing
attainable democratic ideals in the context of church-state disputes.
From there, this Article identifies a couple footholds in modern
jurisprudence from which lower courts, notwithstanding recent
Supreme Court decisions, could and should offer more leeway to local
governments on issues implicating religion.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a brief history of
local governments, starting in pre-Revolution England and the colonies,
and describes how local entities often preexisted the central
government as the primary means of self-government, including on
matters dealing with religious practice. The history reveals that,
contrary to modern assumptions, local governments were not always
seen as subunits of states, but instead, were often treated as voluntary
quasi-private associations that possessed considerable power as a
matter of custom. Part I continues by demonstrating why that historical
honor is well-deserved—that local governments do an especially good
job at dealing with matters affecting religion from a democratic and
utilitarian perspective. Part II applies that historical-theoretical
perspective to recent Supreme Court cases. It concludes that the
Supreme Court has wrongly failed to identify the “level” of government
as centrally important in religion cases. It critiques recent cases that
limit government discretion under the banner of religious free-exercise,
and cases that appear to give substantial power to the states and the
federal government on the Establishment Clause side. Part III provides
a smaller-scale, short-term solution. It first concludes that, despite the

autonomy even against states, yet Professor Hills argues for greater autonomy for both
localities and states.
22 To be clear, the Supreme Court, as I will explain, has not specifically decided that a
local government’s unique status as a locality is immaterial to church-state disputes.
Instead, such considerations are for the most part simply not on the Court’s radar.
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Court’s overall ignoring of the value of local autonomy, the variety of
balancing tests the Court has employed to address these disputes give
lower courts some limited room to consider the nature of the
government entity when considering whether a government action runs
afoul of the First Amendment’s religion clauses. Next, Part III recounts
the difference between facial and as-applied challenges and argues that
the preference for as-applied challenges articulated by the Supreme
Court should be especially strong when a local government action is
challenged. Relatedly, it then considers the principles undergirding the
law of remedies and contends that courts considering local government
actions that affect religious interests should, when possible, prefer
narrow, party-specific remedies like damages and individualized
exemptions over broader remedies like complete invalidation of a law.
II. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AS THE HISTORIC HOMES FOR COMMUNITY
EXPRESSION
The predominant understanding of modern United States
federalism is relatively simple. The federal government, for the areas in
which it acts, is supreme over state and local governments.23 And state
governments are supreme over local governments, which basically serve
as agents bound to do their states’ will.24 Yet, because of the historical
importance and preexistence of local governments, that strict
hierarchical system assumed today was not always a foregone
conclusion. From before the American Revolution, local governments in
England and what became the United States served as the primary
conduits of community association and self-governance.25 Local
governing bodies often sprung up in communities organically for the
purpose of furthering the welfare and values of that community.26 When
larger governments coalesced and claimed authority over massive
territory, local entities within that territory were generally left alone to
act under broad customary powers.27 These powers were often leveraged

23 U.S. CONST. art. VI (“This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges
in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
24 See discussion in section II.A, infra.
25 See discussion in section II.A, infra.
26 See, e.g., Charles W. Tooke, The Status of the Municipal Corporation in American
Law, 16 MINN. L. REV. 343, 349 (1932).
27 Id.
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toward explicitly religious ends. Local governments were not treated
like states or states’ agents.28 They were distinct in identity and role.
That history is not an arbitrary result of chance acts of political will.
It was, in some ways, natural. Local governments grew up organically
because they are accessible settings for group association and effective
conduits of democracy. Often presiding over populations that are
relatively homogenous, geographically and culturally, local
governments are ready-made tools for community self-expression. And
although broad policy agreement, especially on matters touching
religion, is almost unheard of at the national (and even state) level
recently, localities foster it often. Thus, when thousands of localities
across a nation are allowed to pursue diverse policy solutions reflective
of local values, the aggregate result is substantially more democratic
than that achieved by one-size-fits-all compromises. For an area
marked by such fundamental and long-lasting philosophical
disagreement as church-state relations, making room for such local
variation is especially appropriate.
A. Brief History of Local Government Power
At least since the Supreme Court’s decision in Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh,29 the prevailing assumption has been that local
governments are essentially little fingers of state governments,
completely at the mercy of state legislatures and presumptively limited
in power and discretion.30 Hunter was decided in 1907. So, decades later
when the religion clauses were incorporated against the states, local
governments were lumped in basically without discussion. Thus, for
seventy or more years the Supreme Court has, without hesitation,
applied the religion clauses almost identically to the federal
government, the states, and localities.31 Based on the historical roots of
local governing bodies, that approach is misguided. A look back in time
reveals that local governments long served a special and active role for
their constituencies—a role that did not depend on any state directive

28 I mean this as an overarching general rule, not an unwavering rule that necessarily
applied to every local governing body.
29 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
30 Frank Vram Zerunyan, The Evolution of the Municipal Corporation and the
Innovations of Local Governance in California to Preserve Home Rule and Local Control,
44 FORDHAM URB L.J. 217, 221 (2017).
31 One exception appears be the rules surrounding standing to challenge expenditures
under the Establishment Clause. A taxpayer challenging federal spending in federal
courts is for the most part limited to challenging congressional action. Hein v. Freedom
From Religion Foundation, Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007) (plurality opinion).

538

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

and often included substantial interaction with the dominant religious
institutions of that local geographic area.
1. The Greater Founding Era
Many local governments preceded the governments of the state or
national jurisdictions in which they came to sit. Indeed, in England,
many localities preexisted the Norman Conquest.32 Such local
governing bodies were usually called “boroughs” and were operated by
administrative and judicial bodies made up of local property holders.33
These bodies, though “unincorporated” in the legal sense, possessed
significant power. They were often “essentially democratic,”34 and thus
generally able to exercise any power or authority those voters within
the local populace thought proper.35
When a greater English government eventually coalesced, these
boroughs generally retained their considerable power and discretion.
Significantly, this retention of autonomy was not typically dependent on
an affirmative declaration of the Crown or Commonwealth36 purporting
to “grant” power.37 Instead, local governing bodies were thought to
retain powers as a matter of custom—they had the powers they
historically exercised.38 That fact makes sense as a matter of historical
evaluation. Local governing bodies had long autonomously exercised
power over their local populations because the local populations
submitted themselves to that authority quasi-democratically.39 So, even
after the Norman Conquest and the establishment of a greater kingdom
or commonwealth, local government power was not dependent on a topTooke, supra note 26, at 346.
Id.
34 Id.
35 That these societies were often “democratic” of course does not mean that all
residents or even most residents had the right to participate in local governance decisions.
36 Throughout this section I generally use “Commonwealth,” “Crown,” “Kingdom” and
sometimes “England” interchangeably. For the purposes of this discussion, the central
point does not depend on the shifting balances of power and evolving governmental
structures of England as a whole.
37 Tooke, supra note 26, at 349 (“We find, however, that by the time of the
Commonwealth the law recognized in them the power of enacting such wholesome and
good laws and ordinances for the better government, oversight and correction of the
borough or city and the people thereof as to the governing authorities should seem good
and proper, ‘so as they be not repugnant to the laws of the nation nor against the public
and common good of the people’ within or without their limits. Such local legislative
power was seldom expressly granted by charter; it was as formerly rather incidental to
the preservation of the ancient customs assured to the borough by the Crown.”).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 346.
32
33
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down delegation of that power but was almost always instead based on
a bottom-up democratic or associational mandate by the local populace.
Of course, the Crown did eventually get involved. Even so, its
involvement was surprisingly limited for quite a long time. First,
England “recognized” the powers of local governments. Specifically, it
recognized that local boroughs and cities had broad legislative power
that should be used to the benefit of the local population, provided such
use was not repugnant to English law.40 Again, this broad autonomy
and power was not typically the result of a charter from the Crown, but
instead from the customary powers of those localities, which came from
the traditions of the local populace itself.41
Second, the Crown did issue charters to many local governments,
allowing them to “incorporate.”42 But corporate charters were limited in
purpose and effect. They usually had little impact on a local governing
body’s ability to legislate broadly based on the preferences of its local
community. Instead, the charter served to make the locality a “person,”
of sorts, for some purposes under English law.43 It enabled the city or
borough to sue and be sued, to contract, and to own, sell, and buy
property.44 Far from making local governing bodies more “public,” or
more like arms of the state, incorporation, if anything, solidified the
private status of localities, treating them like individual persons for the
purposes of English law.45 Indeed, not until around a century after the
American founding were corporations divided into categories like
“private” and “public.”46 Corporations of all sorts, including municipal
corporations, were simply corporations.47
For centuries, local governments in England held great power and
discretion; not because the government of England said they could, but
because such entities simply functioned in accordance with the wishes

Id. at 349.
Id.
42 Id. at 348.
43 Id.
44 Id. (“The result of incorporation was to enable the borough to hold property, and to
sue and be sued as an individual or as the private corporation of a later day.”).
45 Id.
46 Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1082 (1980) (“It
must be understood that before the nineteenth century, there was no distinction in
England or in America between public and private corporations, between businesses and
cities. As a legal matter, all these corporations had the same rights.”).
47 An interesting doctrinal and historical fact, discussion of which is beyond the scope
of this article, is that today’s “private” corporations do have rights to religious exercise.
40
41
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of the people48 over which they operated.49 When the government of
England did recognize them, it primarily did so to affirm that they
could carry on as they had, and even treated them as private persons
for purposes of contract and property law. This overall framework
continued through the establishment of the American colonies and
subsequent revolution. By the time that English system of local
governments began to deteriorate, the American experiment was a halfcentury under way.50
Not surprisingly, local governments in the colonies and the early
United States shared some similarities with their historic English
counterparts. When English (and Dutch) colonies were established in
North America, presumptions about local power were carried across the
Atlantic as well. Small population centers sprouted across rural areas of
New York and New England, and these centers were generally
presumed to have all standard local legislative powers.51 So, like in
England in years before, local governments popped up almost naturally,
and by local democratic right possessed significant autonomy and power
over their small jurisdictions.
One notable difference between these local entities and many of
their predecessors across the sea, however, was that the relevant
“larger” government was typically more involved from an earlier
stage.52 Early in the life of these local governing bodies, the Crown,
colonial legislature, or state would often grant incorporation.53 Like in
England for centuries past, however, incorporation was not primarily a
grant of legislative power but was a conferral of a degree of
personhood.54 It allowed the incorporated localities to deal with

48 At least, according to the wishes of those with the requisite status to have a say in
the local governing body’s direction.
49 In fact, this conception of local government power was even prevalent centuries
earlier in the Roman Empire. Tooke, supra note 26, at 346 (“This attribute of juristic
personality enabled [local governments] to acquire large property rights and to maintain
local customs and institutions, which from many points of view were separate and distinct
from those of the Roman State as a whole.”).
50 Tooke, supra note 26, at 349 (describing how the English system of local government
began to deteriorate in the mid-1800s).
51 See, e.g., Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case
Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 419–20 (1985).
52 Indeed, the very nature of the colonies was that the original establishment of
colonial settlements was often blessed by the monarch over the nation for which the
colony was established.
53 Tooke, supra note 26, at 350–52 (describing the establishing and incorporating of
towns in various colonies under English and Dutch systems).
54 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 51, at 408.
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property, make contracts, sue, and be sued.55 In some cases, however,
the central authority would more specifically grant special legislative
powers to these municipal corporations, like the power to levy a new
type of tax.56 Thus, it appears that in the colonies local governments sat
in a somewhat nebulous state, presumptively holding substantial power
and authority simply by the fact of the communities’ existence, but also
in many ways subject to the ultimate authority of the Crown.57 They
were quasi-private entities with a right to exist and operate by the will
of the geographically-coalesced community that willed it, and at the
same time used by colonial governments (and sometimes the Crown) as
administrative centers for the furtherance of greater colonial policies.
Towns in the colonies thus drew much of their power democratically
from the ground up. As Gerald Frug described, colonial towns
increasingly established their power on the basis of the direct
popular sovereignty exercised in town meetings. By the late
eighteenth century, colonial legislatures were far from being
considered a threat to town liberty — a role assigned to the English
King and his colonial representatives — since these legislatures were
composed of representatives of the towns who were under explicit
instructions to represent the towns’ interests.58

When the colonies revolted and a new nation was eventually
established, local governments again teetered on a narrow fence—
functioning as independent quasi-private corporations with substantial
power over their residents, but also under the will of the new state
legislature for purposes of maintaining incorporated status.59 In some

55 See, e.g., id. (“Thus, in considering whether towns could sue and be sued, by 1826
New York courts had begun tentatively to suggest that towns were corporations. But the
issue was by no means clearly settled. In 1828 the legislature attempted to resolve the
matter by passing an act that proclaimed towns and counties to be ‘bodies corporate,’ with
the power to sue and be sued, to purchase and hold lands, to contract, and ‘to make such
orders for the disposition, regulation or use of its corporate property, as may be deemed
conducive to the interests of its inhabitants.’”).
56 Tooke, supra note 26, at 355 (“The various cities applied from time to time for
authority to levy taxes for specified local purposes, and the acts of the colonial legislatures
conferring this power constitute the nearest approach to a legislative control over their
activities.”).
57 This nebulous state would likely not have been confusing to people at the time. Local
governments sat in relation to the state substantially (though perhaps not entirely) in the
same way as private corporations do today. The primary difference is these governing
bodies acted with what we might now call “public” powers.
58 Frug, supra note 46, at 1096.
59 Again, though the nature of these local entities might appear ambiguous or in flux to
us modern onlookers, their relationship to the state was really somewhat straightforward.
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states, like Connecticut and Rhode Island, the powers of local
governments resulting from incorporation were deemed to flow from the
new state legislature (even if the original corporate charter came from
the English Crown).60 As Charles Tooke later noted, after the American
Revolution, and “from the organization of the new state governments[,]
it was assumed that the legislature was the source of all new corporate
powers.”61
It is important to note what that does not necessarily mean. It does
not mean that local governments received all their powers from states,
or that local governments were primarily administrative arms of
states.62 State supremacy in the early United States appears to have
been mostly about those powers granted by corporate charter. So, just
as a state legislature through a corporate charter could give a locality
the right to be considered as a person for certain purposes under the
law of that state, so too the state could change course and by legislative
action stop treating the locality as such a person. This state power, in
my view, says little to nothing of state supremacy over actions that
localities take under their customary powers;63 under their seemingly
natural authority to legislate over their community consistently with
that community’s democratically expressed wishes.
Before and after the American founding, local governments were not
primarily treated like states, or like administrative arms of states. They
were treated more like voluntary associations allowed to exercise power
by those who chose to, or happened to, live under their territorial
jurisdiction. In a way, then, localities in England and the United States
often functioned as manifestations of true social contracts in ways that
larger entities did not and perhaps cannot.64 Because of their limited
geographic size, often relatively homogenous cultural makeup, and
responsiveness to the will of residents, local governments existed as
They were subject to state control as to their corporate status in the same way that
modern corporations’ corporate status can largely be dictated by state law. The
relationship was less like that of superior and subordinate governments than of the state
and private associations.
60 Tooke, supra note 26, at 351.
61 Id. at 355.
62 After all, as Charles Tooke described it, legislative power over local governments at
this time was still “extremely limited.” Id.
63 Again, central governments from before the American Revolution often simply
identified preexisting powers of local governments. Just as a church or a private company
needs no permission to declare and enforce rules over its members, so too were localities
allowed to operate as to their residents without much constraint.
64 Larger entities perhaps cannot function in this way because the larger the
jurisdiction’s geographic area, the more difficult it is for people to voluntarily move
somewhere else.
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beacons of democratic ideals, mostly independently of any outside
grants of power.
Significantly, these local bodies often waded directly into matters of
religion. The customary powers of boroughs in England in the 1600s,
even for non-incorporated boroughs, included the right to “have a way
to their church, or to make By-lawes for the reparations of the Church,
the well ordering of the Commons and such like things.”65 A
Connecticut court in 1796 held that “[e]very town incorporated by law
contains in it all the rights, powers and privileges of an ecclesiastical
society, and are subject to all duties: and so long as they remain one
entire body may manage their ecclesiastical concerns in town
meetings . . . .”66 As the Supreme Court has noted, local government in
the 1700s and 1800s gave grants directly to religious schools for the
education of poor citizens.67 One reason for this heavy “entanglement”
between local government and religion appears to be that local
communities were often relatively homogenous from a religious
standpoint, and operated under “parishes,” local units of church
government.68 Parish authority and other forms of community
government sometimes operated in an interlocking and overlapping
way, and courts (among other entities) apparently did not see this as a
problem.69 Indeed, when a state granted corporate status to a town or
parish, the citizens of that locality were still generally bound to their
preexisting obligations to the local government.70 Overall, in these early
local jurisdictions, “the relationship . . . between the aspects of
association represented by the town and the aspects of association
represented by the family and by religion was often quite close.”71
Although England itself in the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries
fluctuated between oppressive national religious establishments and
relative individual freedom, the right of local entities to operate
amongst their own communities was never seriously questioned.72
Localities could therefore “practice” religion to the same degree
individuals could. And in the colonies, though territory-wide
establishments were common, smaller groups of people were often
Williams, supra note 51, at 386.
Id. at 419 (emphasis added).
67 Espinoza v. Montana Dept. of Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2258 (2020) (citing MCCONNELL,
ET AL., supra note 17, at 318–19).
68 Williams, supra note 51, at 419–20 (describing such parishes).
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Frug, supra note 46, at 1097.
72
JOHN WITTE, JR., & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 18–20 (4th ed. 2016).
65
66
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expressly allowed to collectively operate under their own set of religious
convictions.73 Exemplary of the relative freedom and power of religious
corporate bodies, in 1820 James Madison made a point to argue against
their ability to perpetually acquire property.74
Thus, in the founding era, local governing bodies, incorporated or
not, held substantial autonomy to act in areas closely implicating
religion. This power was largely inherent, not the result of a grant from
the Crown, colony, or state.
2. The Wrong Turn of Modern History
Of course, most modern readers of the law assume that local
government power relating to church-state issues is not nearly as broad
as this historical account describes. So, what brought about the change?
Many factors contributed, of course, but I will discuss a couple primary
checkpoints: the views made famous by John F. Dillon and the
culmination and enshrinement of such views in the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh.75 These views solidified local
governments’ radically subordinate status to their respective state
governments. After explaining the view solidified by these sources, I
will critique that view as relying on a misunderstanding of the history
of local power.
Strong local government autonomy mostly ruled the day until the
mid to late 1800s.76 By that time, classic liberal principles, through
which people often viewed society as primarily divided between the
state and the individual, could not manage local governments’ dual or
overlapping status.77 Thus, the distinction of private corporations and
public corporations was fabricated, and local governments were thrown
into the latter.78 And slowly, the smaller “public” institutions had to fall
Id. at 22.
MCCONNELL, ET AL., supra note 17, at 62.
75 207 U.S. at 161.
76 Frug, supra note 46, at 1108 (explaining that “prior to the 1850’s, local autonomy
remained largely intact”).
77 Id. at 1099 (“On a deeper level, the corporation represented an anomaly to liberal
thinkers who envisioned the world as sharply divided between individual rightholders
and state power, the ruled in conflict with the ruler. The corporation exhibited traits of
both poles: it was part ruled and part ruler, both an association of individuals and an
entity with state-granted power.”).
78 Id. at 1099–1100 (“The corporation as an entity that was simultaneously a
rightholder and a power wielder thus disappeared. In its place emerged the private
corporation, which was an individual rightholder, and the public corporation, an entity
that was identified with the state. The very purpose of the distinction was to ensure that
some corporations, called ‘private,’ would be protected against domination by the state
and that others, called ‘public,’ would be subject to such domination.”).
73
74

2021]

RELIGION AND LOCAL POWER

545

in line under the larger public institution—the state.79 Exemplary of
this developing perspective is the view of John F. Dillon, who for a time
served on the Supreme Court of Iowa. In his opinion, “[m]unicipal
corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from, the [state] legislature. It breathes into them the breath of
life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. If
it may destroy, it may abridge and control.”80 Dillon thus thought that
because corporate status is granted by the state, the state has plenary
authority over all dealings of the municipal corporation if not limited by
a state constitutional provision.
Not all of his contemporaries agreed, though. Thomas Cooley of the
Michigan Supreme Court, commenting on the rights of local
governments, said that “when the state reaches out and draws to itself
and appropriates the powers which from time immemorial have been
locally possessed and exercised . . . we seem forced back upon and
compelled to take up and defend the plainest and most primary axioms
of free government . . . .”81 He thus viewed the preservation of local
government power against significant encroachments by the state as a
fundamental protection of democracy and personal liberty:
The doctrine that within any general grant of legislative power by
the constitution there can be found authority thus to take from the
people the management of their local concerns, and the choice,
directly or indirectly, of their local officers, if practically asserted,
would be somewhat startling to our people, and would be likely to
lead hereafter to a more careful scrutiny of the charters of
government framed by them, lest sometime, by an inadvertent use of
words, they might be found to have conferred upon some agency of
their own, the legal authority to take away their liberties
altogether.82

Unfortunately, Judge Cooley’s view did not win out in the long run.
Beyond the purifying force of predominant liberal thought, sociological
concerns demanded city subjugation. Racist and classist views
permeated the minds of many in power, driving them to find a way to
keep at bay the “mob-like” actions of cities, thought to be overrun with
the working class, immigrants, and racial minorities.83
Id.
City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & M.R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455, 475 (1868).
81 People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 109 (1871).
82 Id. at 97.
83 Frug, supra note 46, at 1107–08 (“Indeed, the vision of cities as being the home of
‘mobs,’ the working class, immigrants, and, finally, racial minorities, is a theme that runs
throughout much of nineteenth and twentieth century thought.”).
79
80
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By the early 1900s, the United States Supreme Court had laid the
final straw breaking local autonomy and solidifying the categorically
inferior status of localities across all states. In Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh, the Supreme Court considered a dispute between the City of
Pittsburgh and the nearby City of Allegheny, which was to be annexed
into Pittsburgh. Even though the majority of the affected Allegheny
residents opposed the annexation, a Pennsylvania statute allowed it
under a provision that approved of such annexations if the majority of
voters, which here also included Pittsburgh residents, were in favor of
the action. The Court was asked to consider whether the annexation
violated various constitutional rights of citizens of Allegheny or
impaired a contract between the City of Allegheny and its residents
that contemplated taxation only by that city for the purpose of
providing services to only those residents.84
The Supreme Court rejected these claims, and also took the time to
lay down a sweeping statement on the inferiority of municipal
corporations. It said that “[m]unicipal corporations are political
subdivisions of the State, created as convenient agencies for exercising
such of the governmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to
them.”85 The Court then went on to explain that just as states have
complete discretion to grant corporate status to local entities, so too
they have complete discretion to limit the powers of those entities, and
the United States Constitution places no constraints on such
withdrawals of local power.86
That perspective spread like wildfire among the states. Within
fifteen years of Hunter, “Dillon’s position on state control of cities was
‘so well recognized that it [was no longer] open to question.’”87 Thus, the
prevailing assumption since then has been that for local governments to
act, they must have received that power to act from their state. States
have approached this local-state relationship in different ways, ranging
from a presumption of local authority, unless the state affirmatively
limits local power, to a presumption of no local authority, unless a state
affirmatively grants power. These approaches are broadly categorized
as forms of either “[H]ome [R]ule” (presuming local power)88 or “Dillon’s

207 U.S. at 174–77.
Id. at 178.
86 Id. at 178–79.
87 Frug, supra note 46, at 1115 (citing WILLIAM MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENT OF
AMERICAN CITIES 53 (1923)).
88 See, e.g., State ex rel. Haynes v. Bonem, 114 N.M. 627, 631 (1992) (describing New
Mexico’s home rule statute at the time).
84
85
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Rule”89 (named after John Dillon and presuming no local power). These
approaches, though, at least share in common the ultimate
fundamental assumption articulated in Hunter: that a state can limit
local power without any constraints other than those that are selfimposed.
This assumption rests on a misapplication of history. As the
reasoning of John Dillon and of the Supreme Court in Hunter shows,
the foundational legal fact supporting a principle of total local
subordination to the state apparently is incorporation. Because the
state grants corporate status to the municipal corporation, as the
argument goes, the municipality owes its entire existence to the state.
And if the municipality’s existence is entirely state-dependent, then its
powers are also entirely state-dependent. Thus, if the state has the
right to create or not create the municipality, it has the right to exercise
its control over the municipality without constraint.90 Municipal
corporations, then, are simply political subdivisions of states—
administrative arms—existing primarily to enact their state’s policies.
The problem with this line of reasoning can be identified by referring
back to the history of local governments generally and municipal
corporations specifically. As described above, historically local
governments often preceded state and national governments or
otherwise sprung up and exercised power without action by the “state.”
And when those central governments did get involved, they often
recognized powers of the localities as a matter of customary fact; the
localities were not necessarily “granted” powers. When a state did
choose to grant corporate status to a locality, that act was not typically
about delivering a new set of legislative powers. It was instead about
allowing the locality to be treated as a person for various purposes
under state law—suing and being sued, holding property, and
contracting. A more accurate assessment of this history, then, shows
that states perhaps had significant power over the corporate status of
localities. But the localities’ power to legislate as to local affairs was a
natural result not of an action by the state but of local community
association and democratic expression.
An analogy may be useful. Imagine neighbor A does not own a lawn
mower and thus has never mowed her back yard. Neighbor B, tired of
seeing the overgrowth next door, lends a lawn mower to neighbor A and

89 See, e.g., S. Constructors, Inc. v. Loudon Cty. Bd. of Educ., 58 S.W.3d 706, 712 (Tenn.
2001) (“It is from this rationale—that local governments have no inherent right to
autonomous self-government—that the rule of strict construction of local governmental
authority arises in this state.”).
90 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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says, “use this to mow your backyard.” If I employed the reasoning of
Hunter’s broad declaration of local inferiority, I might absurdly say that
neighbor B now controls all aspects of what neighbor A can and cannot
do with her back yard. But if I took a more reasoned approach, I might
instead say that neighbor B simply has the right to take the lawn
mower back, preventing neighbor A from continuing to mow. Neighbor
A might be subordinate to neighbor B’s will as to the use of the lawn
mower, but not as to the use of the back yard, to which neighbor A
always had a right to generally use as she wished.91
Curiously, during the time the Supreme Court failed to recognize the
historical status of localities when it meant preserving their power
against states, it did treat localities as distinct when doing so meant
limiting their power. In 1890, the Court addressed a case in which a
county government argued they were shielded from a lawsuit in federal
court by the Eleventh Amendment, which by its terms protects states.92
Although the Court recognized the close relationship between a county
and state, it rejected the county’s argument, holding the Eleventh
Amendment only protects true state entities.93 It explained that,
while the county is territorially a part of the State, yet politically it is
also a corporation created by and with such powers as are given to it
by the State. In this respect it is a part of the State only in that
remote sense in which any city, town, or other municipal corporation
may be said to be a part of the State.94

Thus, by the early 1900s, the Court inhibited local power in two
ways, and did so contrary to history in one of those ways. Its decision to
treat localities as fundamentally distinct from states under the
Eleventh Amendment was correct, but it failed to apply that distinction
as it should have when discussing the powers of localities vis-à-vis the
state more generally.
The historical account described above prompts significant questions
beyond the scope of this Article. Should Hunter be overruled entirely?
Do local governments possess some sort of customary or common-law
right to self-government—a right that can be leveraged to defend
against state or federal action? Might the answer to that question
depend on the history of the particular locality (such as whether and

91 Of course, this analogy should not be stretched beyond its limited purpose. I do not
mean to say that state and local governments do or did relate to each other as
“neighbors.”
92 Lincoln Cty. v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
93 Id. at 530.
94 Id.
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with what powers the locality “preexisted” the state or the corporate
charter)? For the purposes of this Article, though, this history means
something more specific in the context of religion: local governments
should not categorically be considered purely as subdivisions or
administrative arms of the states in which they reside. And if they are
not, then treating them identically to states under the religion clauses
likely reflects a misunderstanding of those entities’ historical nature
and function. History showcases the central democratic role local
governments have played regarding matters of religion. And, as the
next subsection explains, this history is justified by democratic and
utilitarian principles.
B. Democratic Ideals and Local Power in Church-State Matters
There’s a reason why local governments historically had significant
discretion over church-state matters: decentering such power and
discretion across local governments furthers democratic principles and
makes room for public expression of community ideals in ways that
actions of states and the federal government likely cannot. In modern
times, though, many people are skeptical of local power and
discretion.95 Understandably so, because such authority has been used
in the past to harm vulnerable populations.96 But local governments,
when given the chance, are also often the first governments to enact
positive change.97 Some people, then, likely see local governments as

95 See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, Why the Worst Governments in America Are Local
MAG.,
INTELLIGENCER,
Sept.
7,
2014,
Governments,
N.Y.
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2014/09/ferguson-worst-governments.html (last accessed
June 20, 2020) (contending that “[t]he myth of localism is rooted deep in our political
psyche.
Left
and
right
alike
use small and local as
terms
of
approbation, big and bureaucratic as terms of abuse. None of us is equipped to see that
the government that actually oppresses us is that which is closest to us”).
96 This has been especially true on matters of race. Nearly all the laws passed that
enforced segregation in the Jim Crow South were enacted and enforced by state and local
governments. Likewise, before the Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967), all the policies against interracial marriage were enacted and enforced by
state and local governments. Consider also San Francisco’s unconstitutional ordinance
from the 1880s that appeared to establish a neutral permitting system but was applied
discriminatorily against people of Chinese descent. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
369–70 (1886).
97 Cities and states have, for example, led the charge to ban discrimination based on
natural hair, even though the federal government has not made a similar move. Mariel
Padilla, New Jersey is Third State to Ban Discrimination Based on Hair, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
20,
2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/20/us/nj-hair-discrimination.html
(last
accessed June 20, 2020) (describing the several cities and states that had taken such
action as of late 2019).
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high-risk, high-reward. This Article challenges that characterization. It
argues that when the balance of power over matters affecting religion is
shifted from centralized to decentralized governing centers, more people
benefit in the aggregate and fewer are significantly harmed, including
groups that are minorities on the national scale. Thus, local government
power in some substantive areas is instead low-risk, high-reward.
Specifically, in the realm of religious liberty, dispersing political power
among the tens of thousands of local governments across the United
States would lead both to less infringement on individual religious
liberty and to more cooperative government support for the common
good.98 Additionally, local government power provides a necessary
avenue by which communities can chart their own course, affirming
their unique values in a public setting. Thus, our church-state
jurisprudence should, to the extent possible within certain broad
constraints, result in less frequent invalidation of local government
actions under both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause. 99
As a general rule, the nation as a whole is more diverse (ethnically,
religiously, racially, and economically) than most local jurisdictions are

98 Erin Duffin, Number of Cities, Towns and Villages (Incorporated Places) in the
United States in 2019, By Population Size, STATISTICA, June 2, 2020,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/241695/number-of-us-cities-towns-villages-bypopulation-size/ (last accessed June 20, 2020).
99 These broad constraints, related to the substantive law, may look substantially
similar to those outlined by Professor Hills. He explains that, based on Supreme Court
precedent, many different approaches to support for religion may be permissible
depending on the factual situation:
Dividing the doctrine into judicially crafted rules that forbid, allow, or require
discrimination on the basis of religion to avoid coercion of either religious
believers or non-believers, one can conveniently organize the precedents
discussed above into six categories:
I. Discrimination in favor of religion to avoid coercion of religious believers
is . . . .
A. . . . . required: E.g., Hosanna-Tabor, Yoder's “hybrid” exception,
Sherbert's balancing test for “systems of individualized exemptions”;
B. . . . . allowed: E.g., Amos, Cutter;
C. . . . . forbidden: E.g., Texas Monthly, Estate of Thornton
II. Discrimination to avoid coercion of religious non-believers is . . .

A. . . . . required: E.g., Remnants of Lemon's “secular effects” test in Zelman;
B. . . . . allowed: E.g., Locke v. Davey;
C. . . . . forbidden: E.g., Widmar-Rosenberger, Trinity Lutheran Church
v.
Comer.
Hills, supra note 19, at 945–46.
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when considered in isolation.100 For example, around twenty-one
percent of people in the United States identify as Catholic.101 Fifty
percent of people in Lafayette, Louisiana identify as Catholic,102 but
only five percent do so in Shreveport, Louisiana.103 That same overall
trend likely continues for other religious or nonreligious groups—many
localities across the nation contain many more persons of one
demographic than the national average, and contain far fewer persons
of another demographic than the national average. The reasons for this
relative homogeneity are complex and will not be addressed in this
Article. What this Article will address, though, are some implications of
that general fact.
The main implication of that fact is that a system of diverse policies
among local governments is more likely to cater to the preferences of
more people than would a single nationwide policy. Imagine that, at the
national scale,104 fifty percent of people support, and fifty percent
oppose, exempting religious institutions from zoning laws limiting
property owners to use their properties for residential uses only. But
then look more closely. Imagine that there are four cities in the nation.
In two of them, cities A and B, the division is still about fifty-fifty. But
in the other two it is more one-sided: in city C seventy percent of the
populace supports the exemption and thirty percent opposes; in city D
seventy percent oppose and thirty percent support.
If Congress passed a law declaring that local governments must
grant religious entities such an exemption from certain general laws,

100 See William H. Frey, Six Maps that Reveal America’s Expanding Racial Diversity,
BROOKINGS
INSTITUTION,
Sept.
5,
2019,
THE
https://www.brookings.edu/research/americas-racial-diversity-in-six-maps/ (containing a
map depicting that in most counties in the United States, all racial minorities are less
represented than in the United States population overall, and that in relatively few
counties are more than one racial minority more represented than on the national level);
Yishai Blank, City Speech, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 365, 390 (2019) (referencing “[t]he
relative homogeneity of local populations and the relatively lower number of issues that
concern many local communities”).
101 America’s Changing Religious Landscape, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, May 12, 2015,
https://www.pewforum.org/2015/05/12/americas-changing-religious-landscape/
(last
accessed June 20, 2020).
102 Denominational Distribution: The Most Catholic and Protestant Cities in the U.S.,
BARNA GROUP, Mar. 15, 2018, https://www.barna.com/research/denominationaldistribution/ (last accessed June 20, 2020).
103 Diocese of Shreveport by the Numbers, ARKANSAS CATHOLIC, Jan. 27, 2020,
https://www.arkansas-catholic.org/news/article/6363/Diocese-of-Shreveport-by-thenumbers (last accessed June 20, 2020).
104 This hypothetical could likewise be applied to a state.
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fifty percent of the nation’s populace would be satisfied and fifty percent
would be displeased.
But what if, instead, Congress abstained, and local governments
were allowed to decide the issue themselves? In City C such a law
requiring exemptions would probably pass, and in City D it probably
would not. Perhaps for cities A and B, one would decide one way and
one would decide the other way. The overall result is that a higher
percentage of the overall population would be satisfied with the law
governing its jurisdiction. Sixty percent would be pleased, and forty
percent would be displeased.105 Compared to the number of people
satisfied by a unified policy in a 300-million-person nation divided fiftyfifty, that is a massive difference. In reality, many localities’
populations are likely even more homogenous than the above example
assumes, so the improvement in overall satisfaction under a system of
local variance would likely be even greater. But the example illustrates
the point which some scholars have raised: as a general rule, when
governing decisions are made by those closer to the governed, the
decisions are more likely to reflect the views of the governed.106
Tapping into these principles, Yishai Blank argues that localities
should have certain free speech rights. Although he does not tailor his
argument to religion specifically, he explains that when cities are
allowed to express their unique views, they become a necessary
component to the pursuit of certain goals: “participatory democracy,
minority protection, policy experimentation, economic efficiency, and
redistribution . . . .”107
Professor Hills provides a related utilitarian justification for greater
state and local power regarding religious free exercise and
establishment specifically. He explains that, assuming state and local
governments are at least constrained from venturing to the very
extremes of free exercise infringement or religious establishment, local
and state variation will lead to more people being more satisfied with
the policies governing their jurisdiction.108 In my view, this argument is
especially compelling when applied to localities, and less so when

105 For example, if each percentage point in this example is one person, then a total of
240 people would be pleased, compared to 160 displeased; this amounts to sixty percent
pleased and forty percent displeased.
106 See, e.g., Hills, supra note 19, at 952 (“Just as proportional representation better
ensures [sic] the representation of each interest than first-past-the-post plurality voting,
federalism better assures representation for each reasonable point of view than national
legislation.”).
107 Blank, supra note 103, at 389.
108 Hills, supra note 19, at 954–59.
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applied to states. But I am in agreement with much of Professor Hills’s
underlying theory.
Professor Schragger likewise argues for greater deference to local
government actions on matters of religion, but he does so primarily
based on the importance of dispersing both governmental and religious
power instead of allowing an agglomeration of such powers in one or a
couple centers.109 He claims dispersion of political power away from
centralized governments and toward local governments (1) prevents the
amassing of power mobilized to help or hurt religion, and (2) challenges
private religious power that may become overambitious and thus
dangerous to those affiliated with minority faiths.110 In this way, he
challenges the classic Madisonian position that smaller jurisdictions are
more vulnerable to factional takeover than larger jurisdictions.111
Professor Schragger thus persuasively argues that the stakes are
higher for centralized governments than for local governments. If a
“faction” gains enough influence in the U.S. Congress to enact its will,
then it can pass nationwide laws that contravene the preferences (or
worse, violate the rights) of potentially more than half of the nation’s
325 million people.
A Madisonian could of course respond that, although the
consequences of factional takeover of Congress might be more severe
than factional takeover of various counties or cities, such a takeover is
substantially less likely to occur at the national level because of the
overall diversity of the United States populace.112 I agree that,
generally, larger jurisdictions may be more resistant to factional
takeover. In my view, however, certain political realities weaken that
position when applied to the United States. First, the structure of the
United States Congress openly gives more weight to the preferences of
rural citizens than it does to urban citizens.113 Whether justified or not,
Schragger, supra note 18, at 1815.
Id.
111 Id.
112 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (“The smaller the society, the fewer
probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct
parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and
the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass
within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of
oppression.”)
113 The Constitution provides for equal representation of states in the Senate, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, and representation in House of Representatives based on the
population of the state, U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 1. Each state is, however, guaranteed at
least one representative in the House. Id. The result is a great disparity between the
power of one person’s vote in a sparsely populated state and that of someone’s vote in a
densely populated state. This also translates to disproportionate voting power in the
109
110
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every state, regardless of its population, is guaranteed at least two
senators and one representative in Congress (and at least three
electoral votes toward choosing the President). And because urban
areas are generally more diverse—culturally, racially, and religiously—
diverse perspectives are less represented institutionally at the national
level.
This apparent failure of representative democracy may be
exacerbated by gerrymandering and hyperpartisanship. Because the
Supreme Court of the United States has declined to weigh in
substantively on political gerrymandering,114 states are mostly free to
continue the practice unless they constrain themselves. Without
exploring here what, if any, constraints should apply to states’ drawing
of congressional districts or state legislative districts, partisan
gerrymandering could undeniably have certain effects. One obvious
effect is that many voting districts are more Democratic or more
Republican than they would be without intentional line drawing to
make them that way. Thus, candidates and incumbents in those
districts have less incentive to choose ideologically moderate solutions
to policy problems. A conservative candidate or representative can be
more conservative, and a liberal candidate or representative can be
more liberal, without jeopardizing their chances of election or
reelection. The bottom line: perhaps, compared to James Madison’s
hopes and expectations, Congress is less likely to pick moderate
compromises and more likely to swing back and forth between more
extreme policies depending on which party holds the majority of seats
in both houses. Thus, an improper local government action is by nature
less harmful, and perhaps not substantially more likely to occur, than a
similar action taken by a federal or state government.115
Finally, local variation is preferable to standardization in the area of
religion because people can more easily relocate to another town than
electoral college. As an example, Wyoming (a rural, sparsely populated state) has a
population of around 580,000 and has three electoral college votes. The ration of
population to electoral college votes is about 193,000:1. New Jersey (a state made up
mostly of urban and dense suburban areas) has a population of about 8,820,000 and
fourteen electoral college votes; a ratio of about 630,000:1. So a single Wyoming citizen’s
vote is worth over three times that of a New Jersey citizen’s vote.
114 See Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019) (treating the issue as a
nonjusticiable political question).
115 Of course, many other factors come into play, some of which may support the
Madisonian position. For example, the smaller size and relative homogeneity of localities
compared to larger jurisdictions may mean that local governments do not benefit from the
same sort of protective inertia as that of their larger counterparts. Local government
policies may change more quickly than state and federal policies, so bad policies (and good
policies) may come into effect at the local level with less warning.
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they can to another country. This familiar justification of course, echoes
Charles Tiebout’s famous theory that citizens, as consumer voters, vote
with their feet by moving to localities with policies that better suit their
desires.116 I do not assume that all residents can relocate without much
difficulty, or that local governments are always likely to change their
policies to attract more taxpaying residents or businesses. Instead, I
simply argue that a bad local law is far less consequential than a
similarly bad federal or state law. If Atlanta passed a law declaring
that landowners are not allowed a religious exemption from certain
zoning regulations, many landowners would have the means to move to
another city with a different policy.117 But if Congress declared the
same thing, far fewer landowners would have the means to move to
another country to avoid the law’s effects.118
In my view, then, principles of democracy and self-governance, as
well as quasi-utilitarian considerations, support allowing local
governments more discretion than the federal and state governments
regarding laws touching religion. But perhaps this invites a different
sort of question: why not go even smaller? Why not totally decentralize
decision-making power, down to the individual level? In other words,
why not favor a system in which government at all levels could do
essentially nothing that touched religion—no laws even resembling any
sort of support for religion, and no laws that have any negative effect on
any sort of religious practice? This argument carries some logical force
at first blush. If the better decisionmaker is the one closer to those
affected by the decision, then theoretically the best decisionmaker of all
is the individual deciding their own course of action. I will not evaluate
here the various and longstanding arguments for and against
libertarianism more generally. But I will briefly describe why I think
this approach may be bound to fail in the specific context of religion.
Put simply, many religious belief systems demand a prominent
public presence. Take as an example, the most common broad religious
affiliation in the United States, Christianity. One central claim of

116 Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 417–
24 (1956). Professor Blank also relies on Tiebout’s theory to justify free speech rights for
cities. Supra note 100, at 396–97.
117 Being able to simply say “go somewhere else” does not justify a bad law. But for
laws within the broad bounds of constitutionality that are still harmful or problematic to
some people, moving may sometimes be a good option. It is, at least, better than being
trapped under the force of that law.
118 Of course, the people who would have the means to move are disproportionately
wealthier. Although fewer lower-income people could easily take advantage of a favorable
set of policies under another local government across state or elsewhere, at least more
people even from lower incomes could move to another locality than to another country.
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Christianity is that “Jesus is Lord.”119 This pivotal credal phrase likely
originated in the Greek language spoken in much of the Roman Empire
in the early Common Era. “Kyrios Iesous” (“Jesus is Lord”) appears to
be an open and opposing alteration to the imperial affirmation “Kyrios
Kaiser” (“Caesar is Lord”).120 From the roots of Christianity, then,
Christians have affirmed their core conviction that Jesus, and not the
political ruler or rulers of the day, is the true and ultimate governing
authority. That conviction, carried through the related hope of the
“Lord’s Prayer” that God’s kingdom would “come . . . on earth as it is in
heaven,”121 has driven strands of Christianity to seek to institute
governing policy that they view as consistent with the intentions of
Jesus for the world. Such pursuits have no doubt looked quite diverse
over time and between Christian sub-groups. But many share some
form of a belief that the kingship, or deity, of Jesus bears directly on
how governing bodies should operate and the laws they should or
should not enact.122
Thus, at least significant sub-groups within major religions may
demand that certain rules be implemented through their adherents’
daily actions at the society-wide level. And, often, that means religion
seeks to spread its views or the implications of its views through the
coercive force of government. The Establishment Clause, at least as it
has been applied in the past sixty or so years, would appear to stand
119 See, e.g., Romans 10:9 (“[I]f you confess with your lips that Jesus is Lord and believe
in your heart that God raised him from the dead, you will be saved.”); Philippians 2:10–11
(“ . . . so that at the name of Jesus every knee should bend, in heaven and on earth and
under the earth, and every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of
God the Father”).
120 Ruth Padilla DeBorst, Confessing Resistance or Complicit Silence?, 12 J. OF LATIN
AM. THEOLOGY, No. 1, 7, 8 (2017) (“When the Roman Emperor claimed Kyrios Kaiser
(Caesar is Lord), daring followers of the Way sung, ‘At the name of Jesus every knee shall
bow and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord’. . . .”).
121 Matthew 6:10.
122 For example, a resolution by the Southern Baptist Convention, the largest
Protestant denomination in the United States, declares that “[a]ll Christians are under
obligation to seek to make the will of Christ supreme in our own lives and in human
society . . . .” On Gospel Allegiance and Political Engagement, Southern Baptist
Convention, 2019, https://www.sbc.net/resource-library/resolutions/on-gospel-allegianceand-political-engagement/(last accessed June 20, 2020). And a Vatican statement on
Catholic political engagement explains that “[f]aith in Jesus Christ, who is ‘the way, the
truth, and the life’ (J[ohn] 14:6), calls Christians to exert a greater effort in building a
culture which, inspired by the Gospel, will reclaim the values and contents of the Catholic
Tradition.” Vatican Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Doctrinal Note on Some
Questions Regarding The Participation of Catholics in Political Life, Nov. 24, 2002,
https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20
021124_politica_en.html (last accessed June 21, 2020).
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opposed to some such efforts. But the pressure has nonetheless
continued from religious groups to recognize religious interests in the
public sphere through government authority.123 For people who
sincerely believe their views demand community-wide recognition and
implementation, vacating the public sphere and sticking to private
personal piety is not an option—such a path would, in their view, both
contravene God’s will and abandon a sincere pursuit of the public good.
Accordingly, some scholars, noting “that some religions are communal
in nature,” have suggested that complete disestablishment at the local
level perhaps means that some “believers are not able to live their
religiously grounded way of life, because the only communities
permitted under the Establishment Clause are diverse, pluralistic
regimes with no official religion.”124
Simply taking those points as anthropological or sociological facts,
and not weighing the merits of the religious adherents’ beliefs, an
extreme libertarianism or individualism likely cannot adequately
accommodate such prevalent and diverse religious convictions that
demand communal expression (indeed, it is no historical accident that
so many local governing bodies sprang up organically and
democratically and exercised influence over the religious life of the local
community). Some religious factions125 will always seek to leverage
government force toward their desired ends. Thus, pressure will always
push on governing bodies to take actions that could be construed as
“establishing” a religion or religious belief system. Increasing local
government power and discretion in areas touching religion, then,
provides a better avenue through which to channel that ever-present
force than if individuals were the only “policymaking” bodies to be
found.126 And placing that power with local governments instead of a

123 See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 570 (2014) (holding that a town
practice of opening public meetings with a clergy-led prayer, that was typically uniquely
Christian in nature, did not violate the Establishment Clause).
124 MCCONNELL, ET AL., supra note 17, at 73.
125 Here this term is not used in a necessarily negative sense. It only refers to a subset
of a religion with a unified public goal.
126 Professor Blank argues that cities, because of their relative internal homogeneity
and relative closeness between the government and community compared to larger
jurisdictions, are necessary avenues by which communities speak their views. Blank,
supra note 103, at 389–90 (“Local governments generally enable people to collectively
engage in political matters in order to become masters of their own fate as a community.
The relative homogeneity of local populations and the relatively lower number of issues
that concern many local communities—though not true in many large or even medium
size cities—makes consensus easier to reach and allows people to deliberate controversial
matters.”).
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larger centralized government will help minimize the consequences
when a religious faction does capture power.127
Finally, it is important to emphasize that, though the theories this
Article articulates could potentially justify greater local power in many
substantive areas, this Article only argues for such autonomy for
matters directly implicating religious liberty. Other issues implicating
other class distinctions, like race, may not be as suited for local
variance. A fuller theory of which other substantive areas might be
well-served by a revived localism is beyond this Article’s scope. But for
the time being it suffices to say that although some issues like explicit
racial discrimination have been largely settled in the court of public
opinion (at least in the nominal sense, as a large majority of people for
some time now has categorically disfavored discrimination based on
race), issues of religious freedom have continued to evade any sort of
meaningful national consensus.
Thus, not only have local governments historically served as unique
bastions of independent self-governance, they also happen to be the best
suited governments to do so regarding matters implicating religion. As
Professor Blank has said, “[l]ocal governments generally enable people
to collectively engage in political matters in order to become masters of
their own fate as a community.”128 Because local governments are more
likely to choose policy positions favored by more of the citizens subject
to the government measures, more citizens on the whole will be
satisfied when the power is dispersed among the many and diverse
governing bodies of this nation’s towns and cities. And for those citizens
who are displeased by the decisions of their local government, moving
elsewhere is more feasible than moving to escape the entire country. So,
compared to a system in which governmental power is centralized at
the federal or state government, or even radically dispersed to the
individual level, this system of local discretion and variation provides a
greater opportunity for America’s citizens to propagate their
community’s desired values in a meaningful way with more limited
negative externalities. Such a system fits comfortably with our
democratic ideals.

127 Professor Schragger makes a related point based on another concern. Schragger,
supra note 18, at 1875 (“Indeed, religious privatism has become the Court's solution to the
problem of church-state relations. But this privatism raises its own concerns: by
bypassing localities and asserting broad norms of government neutrality, the Court has
inadvertently undermined the civic community as both a relevant political entity and a
counterweight to private religious power.”).
128 Blank, supra note 103, at 389–90.
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III. EVALUATING RECENT TRENDS AT THE SUPREME COURT
Despite the historical and theoretical advantages of a system of local
discretion, the Supreme Court has not distinguished between different
levels of government when considering religion clause challenges.
Although the Rehnquist Court gave some signs of deferring to the
political branches of governments in general,129 the Roberts Court has
pushed a slightly different direction. Over the last fifteen or so years,
the Supreme Court has limited government discretion, especially on the
free exercise side, even while maintaining some leniency on the
establishment side. The result, some commentators have argued, may
be that governments, from the smallest to the largest, must
affirmatively support religion if they want to support anyone at all.130
Supreme Court jurisprudence thus has failed to account for the history
and theory described in Part I that supports local autonomy on matters
of religion.
There is no need here to recount all the relevant Supreme Court
decisions up until the late stages of the Rehnquist Court; Professor
Schragger explored those cases extensively.131 He noted that, by and
large, the Supreme Court has not directly relied on the level of the
government entity when determining the constitutionality of a
government action under the religion clauses.132 But he also argued
129 Schragger, supra note 18, at 1816 (speaking of the Rehnquist Court and explaining
that “[o]n the Free Exercise Clause side, the Supreme Court has rewritten the
requirements for religious accommodation, holding in Smith v. Employment Division that
generally applicable neutral laws may be applied to religiously motivated activity without
meeting a compelling interest test,” and describing that “on the Establishment Clause
side, the Court has recently lifted the traditional limitation on public funding of religious
education with its decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris that a voucher regime that
permitted Cleveland school children to use public monies to attend religious schools did
not violate the Establishment Clause”).
130 See, e.g., Edward Correia, Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer: An Unfortunate New
Anti-Discrimination Principle, 18 RUTGERS J. L. RELIGION 280, 294 (2017) (“First, Trinity
Lutheran creates a very narrow channel through which the government must navigate. If
it goes too far in providing assistance, it violates the Establishment Clause, but once any
benefit is permitted by the Establishment Clause, it is also required by the Free Exercise
Clause to be offered to religious organizations, including pervasively sectarian
organizations such as churches. Deciding when a government program violates the
Establishment Clause in direct aid cases is not easy. Thus, many states would prefer to
take a more cautious approach to avoid this complicated line-drawing. The decision in
Trinity Lutheran takes that choice away from them. There is no intermediate zone of
discretion for states attempting to draw a more cautious Establishment Clause line. Or,
another way of saying it is that the Locke version of ‘play in the joints’ is probably dead.”).
131 Schragger, supra note 18, at 1832–37.
132 Id. at 1838 (“Granted, neither Smith nor Boerne made an institutionalist argument
that state or local governments can be trusted to act responsibly toward religious

560

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

that the Court had moved toward allowing more discretion to
policymaking branches generally in the area of funding.133 This trend
was showcased most obviously by the decision in Locke v. Davey.134 In
that case the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require
the State of Washington to provide a scholarship to a student who
otherwise would have qualified based on the scholarship’s criteria but
was disqualified because he wanted to use the funds to study devotional
theology.135 More specifically, the Court described such governmental
action as that which falls within the “play in the joints”—not covered by
either of the religion clauses.136 So, though the State of Washington
likely could have funded the plaintiff’s schooling without violating the
Establishment Clause, it did not have to fund the schooling to comply
with the Free Exercise Clause.137 The Locke decision thus secured some
room for policymaking branches of governments to act without
constraint from the religion clauses of the federal constitution. That
decision applies to all governments throughout the United States, not to
local governments alone. But, in a way, it won half the battle for local
autonomy.
However, the Roberts Court may interpret the Free Exercise Clause
more broadly, and so limit the discretion of government actors. In
Trinity Lutheran, the Court held that the State of Missouri violated the
Free Exercise Clause by not issuing a grant to a school operated by a
church.138 In that case, the state created a grant program by which
educational entities could be reimbursed for funds spent to rubberize
playground surfaces. The plaintiff church (which operated a school with
a playground) applied for the grant. Based on the criteria set forth by
the state’s program, the school ranked highly on the list of prospective
recipients. But the state denied the grant because of the school’s
religious status based on a state constitutional provision that prohibited
any public funds from going to religious institutions.139

minorities, or that the dispersal of political authority is a necessary component of
religious liberty.”).
133 Id. at 1865. Professor Schragger also argues that the combination of Smith and
Boerne gives (or should give) more room for localities to chart their own course on matters
of religion without federal interference. Id. at 1837–38.
134 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
135 Id. at 715. He was disqualified under a “no-religious-aid” provision in the
Washington State Constitution.
136 Id. at 719.
137 Id.
138 137 S. Ct. at 2024–25.
139 Id. at 2017–18.
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The Supreme Court held that exclusion from the grant program
violated the school’s free-exercise rights.140 It is still somewhat unclear
how broad that decision was.141 For example, perhaps the result would
have been different if the funds were to be used for a purpose that
appeared more “religious” than a playground—say, if the grant program
supported building renovation costs and the plaintiff sought funds to
help with its renovation of a worship center. At the very least, the
Court’s decision could give some support to a broader principle: that
governments must always fund religious entities if they also want to
fund any other private entities.142
This reading is bolstered by the Court’s recent decision in Espinoza v.
Montana Department of Revenue.143 That case arose from a state
program that gave scholarship funds to students attending private
schools. When the petitioners sought to use such scholarship funds at
religious schools, the state supreme court struck down the entire
program under a state constitutional provision that, like the provisions
in Locke and Trinity Lutheran, prohibited aid to religious
institutions.144 The Supreme Court of the United States decided that
application of the no-aid provision violated the Free Exercise Clause.145
Despite objections that the government action was more similar to that
of Locke v. Davey,146 the Court held that the state could not exclude
religious entities from the program.147 It did not claim to abandon Locke
v. Davey, but instead attempted to distinguish it. The Court said that
governments may avoid funding religious actions (like pursuing an
education to become a minister) but could not exclude people or entities
from funding programs based on their religious status.148 Ultimately, it
viewed the latter as “indirect coercion” and thus a “punishment” for the
free exercise of religion.149

Id. at 2024–25.
The Court distinguished Locke v. Davey because in its view the Trinity Lutheran
case involved discrimination based on the religious status of the claimant, whereas the
program in Locke allowed funds to religious individuals, but not to support religious
action. Id. at 2023.
142 See, e.g., Correia, supra note 130.
143 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
144 Id. at 2251.
145 Id. at 2263.
146 Id. at 2257.
147 Id. at 2261 (“A State need not subsidize private education. But once a State decides
to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.”).
148 Id. at 2256.
149 Id. at 2256–57.
140
141
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For the purposes of this article, the point of discussing these cases is
not necessarily to evaluate the merits of the Court’s understanding of
the Free Exercise Clause as applied to the governing entities in those
particular cases (generally states or state agencies). It is to point out
another problem: that the expanded understanding of the Free Exercise
Clause applies against local governments just as much as it does
against the federal government and to states, and so limits the
discretion of governments operating over even the smallest
jurisdictions. This trend is of course substantially strengthened by the
federal Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA)150 and the propagation of state-level Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts (RFRAs).151 Such provisions intentionally constrain
governments even beyond what the Free Exercise Clause requires. They
identify situations in which government actions affecting religious
interests must satisfy strict scrutiny. And significantly, they likely
affect local government power most of all.152
On the issue of government-supported religious expression under the
Establishment Clause, however, the Roberts Court appears to be taking
a more deferential approach. But this deference may not ultimately
benefit local governments. In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Court
upheld the practice of a locality beginning its public meetings with
prayer, most often led by local Christian clergy.153 In the Court’s view,
even sectarian prayers at public meetings, if not conducted in a way
that coerces members of the public into taking part, do not violate the
Establishment Clause.154
The Court has recently signaled its continued narrower
interpretation of the Establishment Clause across a range of factual
contexts. In American Legion v. American Humanist Association,155 the
Court decided that the State of Maryland’s display of forty-foot-tall
cross on public land as part of a World War I memorial did not violate

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
More than twenty states have passed such provisions in response to the Supreme
Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), that held the federal
RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to state and local governments.
152 RLUIPA targets land use, which is a policy area traditionally handled by local
governments. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I--The Structure of Local Government
Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1990) (“Land use control is the most important local
regulatory power.”). So, the federal statute forcefully limits local governments in one of
the primary areas they typically have discretion.
153 575 U.S. at 569–70.
154 Id. at 589–90.
155 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).
150
151
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the Establishment Clause.156 Applying a presumption that historically
standing monuments are constitutional, and over arguments that a
cross is necessarily Christian, the Court held the cross in that context
had acquired a secular meaning, and therefore the state’s maintenance
of the cross did not impermissibly establish a religion.157 That decision
thus may provide more leeway to governments that want to display
symbols with religious significance on government land.
The Court’s religion jurisprudence over the last fifteen or so years
certainly resists any simple characterization. But there does appear to
be a general trend of operating under a slightly more expansive
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause158 and a more limited
understanding of the Establishment Clause. The overall effect, then, is
to raise both the floor and ceiling; policymakers at all levels of
government can choose between supporting religious interests to the
same degree as they support anything else or, in some special
circumstances, supporting religious interests more than other interests.
Little discretion is allowed, though, to governing bodies that want to
support some interests, but not religious ones.
There are several intertwined problems with this trend as it relates
to the discretion afforded to local governments. First, although it
appears to give all governments more space to support religious
messages or entities either financially or symbolically, it does not
necessarily allow localities to take the contrary path. This system
therefore inhibits the goal of diversity between localities because no
government may take a course of action that avoids supporting religion,
unless that government chooses to support no one at all. Second, the
recent trend appears to give about as much discretion to states and the
federal government as it does to localities.159 That is a problem for
Id. at 2074.
Id.
158 The Court’s decision in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct.
1613 (2020), may be a minor counterexample to this trend. In that case, the Court denied
an injunction requested by California churches against enforcement of a California policy
that sought to limit the spread of the pandemic-causing disease known as COVID-19. The
policy limited the number of people who could attend a religious service. Id. at 1613
(Roberts, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Roberts, who voted with the majority, wrote his
own opinion that explained the policy appeared consistent with the Free Exercise Clause
because it subjected churches to the same gathering restrictions as concerts, sporting
events, and other large gatherings. Id. The Court’s decision prevailed over objections that
the policy treated religious interests as inferior to secular interests because many other
businesses, such a grocery stores, restaurants, and hair salons, were not subject to the
same restrictions. Id. at 1614 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
159 Of course, one major exception is laws in areas beyond the reach of Congress’s
comparatively more limited powers.
156
157
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localities because of the hierarchy built into the United States system of
federalism. Once the state or federal government acts in its discretion,
like it did with RLUIPA, to provide some additional support for
religious entities, local governments are often powerless to chart their
own course in that subject area.160 So, this incomplete “discretion for
all” trend under the Establishment Clause in fact provides more
discretion for the federal government and state governments than for
localities. It is as if someone declared to a father and his financiallydependent son, “each of you may choose to take a vacation to either
Aruba or New York.” The freedom to choose only truly extends to the
son to the extent the father does not object to the son’s choice. In other
words, the Supreme Court’s relative lenience toward religious
establishments, when applied to the federal government and state
governments, allows the federal government and states to limit
localities’ discretion on the free-exercise side.161
IV. LETTING LOCAL DISCRETION IN THROUGH THE BACK DOOR
Is there a bright side? Sort of. The Supreme Court has not explicitly
foreclosed considering the local nature of a government actor in churchstate disputes. The various balancing tests the Court employs give some
room for lower courts to consider such factors, and doing so could result
in more lenience to local governments in these cases than that afforded
to the states and the federal government. Moreover, even if a court does
determine that a local government action is problematic under the
religion clauses, when choosing a remedy, the court should often choose
a narrower remedy that allows the government to continue its popular
programs even while providing relief to the specific parties those
programs might harm most. These approaches are second-best to the
ideal of the Supreme Court explicitly recognizing the unique nature of
local governments in its substantive religion clauses analysis.
Nevertheless, if courts follow these approaches, they can create some
necessary space for community expression and local variation that will
serve the democratic and liberty interests of this nation’s people.

160 A federal law preempts a conflicting state or local law. And because, as a general
rule, local governments have recently been treated purely as creatures of state law. A
state law often preempts a conflicting local law.
161 Again, RLUIPA is a good example of this phenomenon. The Supreme Court has not
held the land use provisions of RLUIPA violate the Establishment Clause, so local
governments must operate with limited discretion in the substantive areas covered by
that federal statute.
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A. Balancing Tests
Although the Supreme Court has not recognized the distinct
historical nature of local governments as great bulwarks of selfgovernment and community expression, it has not gone as far as to say
that a local government’s status as a local government is entirely
irrelevant. Indeed, the Court’s analysis in several cases over the last
few decades provides a precedent-rooted way for courts to consider such
a factor moving forward. By incorporating a variety of balancing tests
into both Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, the Court has paved the way to consider whether local
government actions may be less burdensome on the interests each
religion clause aims to protect. These balancing analyses exist on the
free-exercise side from both the vestiges of pre-Employment Division v.
Smith162 foundational case law and from statutes calling for a form of
elevated scrutiny. And the balancing analyses are even more diverse
and ad hoc on the Establishment Clause side, where the factual and
historical context of a government display or program is central. All in
all, the “level,” so to speak, of the government actor performing the
challenged action can and should matter in these analyses. And,
typically, factoring in that consideration will lead to greater deference
for local governments than for the state and federal governments.
1. Free Exercise Balancing
Free Exercise Clause claims are governed by the standard set by the
Supreme Court in Employment Division v. Smith.163 Under that
standard, a claimant is not entitled to a religious exemption from a
neutral and generally applicable law that incidentally burdens the
claimant’s religious practice.164 But in some cases a form of elevated
scrutiny analysis still applies. These include when the government
action being challenged specifically targets religion,165 when the nature

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Often a religious freedom claim will be brought not directly under the Free Exercise
Clause, but under a statute such as the federal RFRA or a state RFRA. In such
circumstances the Smith standard would not apply.
164 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79.
165 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018)
(holding the claimant’s free-exercise rights were violated when the government
commission that pursued an action against him exhibited hostility and animus toward the
claimant’s religious viewpoint); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993) (holding that an ordinance that targeted a single religious group
because of its religion-motivate animal sacrifice practice violated the Free Exercise
Clause).
162
163

566

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

of the government action invites individualized exemptions,166 and
when the government action burdens a “hybrid” right—one that
involves elements of religious exercise and other fundamental rights
like free speech.167 In such cases, the government must show that its
action is narrowly tailored in pursuit of a compelling government
interest.
Local governments should have an easier time making such a
showing than their state and federal counterparts. First, a local
government action is likely to be more “narrowly tailored,” in the
general sense of that term, than a law of similar substance passed by a
government that presides over a larger and more diverse jurisdiction.168
Second, local governments historically have held the role of legislating
for the sake of health, safety, morals, and the general welfare.169 And
they have done so as a manifestation of voluntary community
association and self-government. Because of this historical
understanding of local government power, when local governments take
any sort of action toward these four classic ends, the interest it pursues
is, I argue, more “compelling” compared to a similar action by the
federal government, which possesses no such police power and is not as
equipped institutionally to take such action.170 Finally, even compared
to state governments, local governments are, for the reasons described
in Part I, well-suited to be a means by which citizens express their
values publicly.171 For all these reasons, courts should recognize that
the scales ought to be tilted in local governments’ favor more than in
states’ or the federal government’s favor when their actions are subject
to elevated scrutiny.
An example related to “hybrid rights” cases may be helpful here.
Imagine a local schoolboard policy that allows community members and
organizations to use school auditoriums after school hours for certain
Smith, 494 U.S. at 884.
Id. at 881 (describing cases that fit that category).
168 Throughout this section, the “narrow tailoring” I conceive of is admittedly different
than that which is dictated by modern doctrine. Modern doctrine, at least in the context of
religious exemptions, often asks whether a government action is narrowly tailored as to
its effects on an individual claimant; I ask whether the government action more generally
is as narrow as it could be to substantially serve the relevant government interest.
169 See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“Public safety, public health,
morality, peace and quiet, law and order — these are some of the more conspicuous
examples of the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs.”).
170 I do not argue that all actions of local governments are in pursuit of compelling
interests. But, because of those entities’ unique role as catalysts of self-government,
associational and democratic rights are more at stake when a local action is challenged
than when a state or federal action is challenged.
171 See supra part II.
166
167
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types of public events, but not for religious services of any kind. Then
picture that a religious group brings a lawsuit claiming the policy not
only infringes on its free exercise of religion, but it is also
impermissible viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.172 Although the law is not precisely
clear on what a claimant must show to have the claim considered as one
that alleges a violation of a “hybrid” right, if the claim is treated as
hybrid, then it will be subjected to an elevated form of scrutiny.173 So,
the schoolboard in this example may have to show that the policy is no
more restrictive than necessary to support a compelling government
interest.
Such a policy should be at least a little easier for a local school board
to justify compared to a similar law at the federal level (say, a policy
that no federal funds will go toward any school district that allows
certain religious groups to use its facilities). The decisions of the local
school board affect only the community covered by that board’s
jurisdiction. That community’s population may strongly favor avoiding
giving public support to religious institutions. So, when faced with
limited space and time with which to use that space, and the
consequences of community backlash if the space is used by religious
groups, perhaps a decision not to open school facilities to religious
services is a more reasonable approach. In other words, the policy is
less likely to be burdensome on a large number of individuals or groups,
and there’s not as likely to be an even-less-burdensome course of action
than the one the school board chose (short of ending all non-student use
of school facilities). Conversely, the federal policy sets the standard for
a wide range of diverse communities across the nation. It therefore is
more burdensome on religious interests overall because it mandates, or
at least strongly encourages, all localities to prohibit religious groups
from using school facilities, whether or not the people of that locality
are generally in favor of such a policy. Similarly, the federal policy is, in
a way, less narrowly tailored. It claims on behalf of all localities an
interest of avoiding all affirmative support for religious interests, but
only some of the localities’ populaces actually support that interest.
This principle holds especially true when the motivation behind a
government action that infringes on a hybrid right (like in the example
above) is to avoid giving positive support to religion and thereby
offending or causing other harm to people who object to such religious
172 These facts share some similarities with those of Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384 (1993), and Good News Club v. Milford Central
School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
173 See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
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interests.174 A uniform federal policy toward such a goal mandates that
policy everywhere, even in those localities where few to no one would be
offended by government support for the exercise of the hybrid right. To
put it in simple mathematical terms, a federal no-religious-aid policy
perhaps hinders the interests of 10,000,000 religious people for the sake
of 10,000,000 people who would be offended by government support for
the religious exercise. But if localities were allowed to chart their own
courses based on the preferences of their own more homogenous
populaces, then a different result could emerge: perhaps the interests of
only twenty percent of religious claimants are harmed for the sake of
around eighty percent of people who would have been offended or
otherwise harmed by a policy supporting those interests.175 This at least
goes to show that when the federal government acts in the interest of
avoiding offense or other psychological harm to nonreligious people, it
often acts too broadly; it could pursue its interest without inhibiting as
many religious people if it provided for a system tailored by locality.176
Local governments have traditionally served the role of legislating
for the health, safety, morals, and general welfare of the communities
they govern. Because of their smaller size and greater homogeneity,
they are able to take a more targeted approach towards pursuing those
important ends. The federal government and state governments are not
as institutionally equipped to make such judgment calls on divisive
issues. So, when local governments are tasked with demonstrating that
their action narrowly pursues an important interest, courts should

174 In both Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza, the Supreme Court appears to have
communicated that, short of an Establishment Clause violation, establishment “concerns”
are not compelling interests justifying an infringement on Free Exercise Clause rights.
These statements should be limited to the facts of those cases, which involved apparent
discrimination against entities based on religious status by a state agency.
175 This may be the case because localities tend to be more homogenous than the nation
as a whole. So, if the large majority of a localities’ populace would be offended by a
particular sort of government aid to a religious interest, that means a small minority
would be in favor of such aid. If the local government acts in accordance with the wishes
of the substantial majority, it gets a lot more “bang for its buck,” harming far fewer and
satisfying far more.
176 This admittedly unconventional conception of narrow tailoring does not fit as neatly
in cases where the claimant challenges a law that provides for a system of individualized
exemptions. That’s because when a government wants to justify not granting an
exemption in those circumstances, it likely must show that its policy of not granting that
particular exemption is narrowly tailored. In such cases, under existing doctrine at least,
it would probably not be relevant whether the government’s program is narrowly tailored
in the broader sense discussed in this section.
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assume that it is more likely the case than if a larger government was
the primary actor.177
2. Establishment Clause Balancing
Even though the Supreme Court does not work under a tiered
scrutiny framework when considering Establishment Clause challenges
to government action,178 it does operate under a vaguely defined
collection of balancing tests. And under these tests, local governments
should have an easier time justifying laws alleged to support an
establishment of religion.
When, for example, courts consider Establishment Clause challenges
to government funding of religious entities, they often apply a loose
derivation of the Lemon Test, which considers the purpose and effect of
the government action.179 Such an approach is exemplified by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris.180 In that case,
the Court considered a state program that provided school vouchers to
students from lower-income families in a city school district.181 The
vouchers were redeemable at any private school, including religious
schools, and ninety-six percent of the students in the program used the
voucher to enroll in religious-affiliated schools.182 The Court held that
the program did not violate the Establishment Clause.183 It applied a
test that considered the purpose and effect of the program.184 Even
though the result of the program combined with the private personal
choices of families was to support religious institutions much more than
non-religious institutions, the program was constitutional because it
177 Under existing doctrine, the burden would still likely be on the government to prove
a compelling interest and sufficiently narrow tailoring. Based on the arguments made in
this Article and others, though, perhaps courts should consider flipping the burden to the
claimant in some cases, requiring it to show either that the local government’s interest is
not sufficiently important or that its method of pursuing that interest is overly broad.
178 Yet, perhaps it should. Richard Fallon has laid out a compelling case. Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59 (2017). See also Scott
J. Ward, Reconceptualizing Establishment Clause Cases as Free Exercise Class Actions, 98
YALE L. J. 1739 (1989) (arguing that Establishment Clause claims should be evaluated
like Free Exercise Clause claims on a broader scale).
179 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (explaining that government
actions must have a secular purpose, must have a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion, and must not foster excessive entanglement between government
and religion).
180 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
181 Id. at 644–45.
182 Id. at 644–45, 647.
183 Id. at 644.
184 Id. at 648–49.
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had a secular purpose—educating children—and did not specifically
incentivize people to support religious interests.185 The Court’s analysis
thus appears to deviate from a traditional Lemon analysis in that under
it, a government action could still be upheld even if every prong of the
test is not precisely met (i.e., even if the program has the effect of
substantially supporting religion). Importantly, it appears that the
Court is willing to balance a variety of considerations when determining
whether a government action violates the Establishment Clause,
including whether the action is intended to support religion, whether it
has the effect of doing so, and whether it encourages people to support
religion by private choice.
Courts also balance a variety of factors when considering whether
public displays and monuments conveying religious themes violate the
Establishment Clause. In such cases, a court more or less simply
considers whether the facts of the case make it appear as though the
public display establishes a religion. Yet, even if the display does clearly
communicate a religious message, it may still be permissible depending
on the context. In Cnty. of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union
Greater Pittsburgh Chapter,186 the Court held the solitary display of a
crèche on courthouse steps was unconstitutional, but upheld the display
of a menorah next to a large Christmas tree and a sign celebrating
freedom.187 Similarly, in McCreary Cnty v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Kentucky,188 the Court struck down a five-year-old solitary
display of the Ten Commandments at a courthouse,189 but in Van Orden
v. Perry190 the Court upheld a several-decades-old display of the Ten
Commandments amidst other monuments on the grounds of a state
capitol.191 From these cases, among others, the Court gradually
developed the “reasonable observer” or “endorsement” test, which asks
whether a reasonable observer seeing the government-supported
display would think the government was endorsing a particular religion
over others, or religion over irreligion.192
Id. at 652–53.
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
187 Id. at 601–02, 620–21.
188 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
189 Id. at 851, 881 (2005).
190 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
191 Id. at 681.
192 Cnty of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 620 (“Given all these considerations, it is not
‘sufficiently likely’ that residents of Pittsburgh will perceive the combined display of the
tree, the sign, and the menorah as an ‘endorsement’ or ‘disapproval . . . of their individual
religious choices.’ Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 390. While an adjudication of the display's
effect must take into account the perspective of one who is neither Christian nor Jewish,
185
186
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From a review of all of these Establishment Clause cases, it is clear
that when courts are called on to decide whether a government action
violates the Establishment Clause, they must consider a wide collection
of factors. Depending on the factual context of the case, these factors
could include the intent behind the government action, the degree to
which the action encourages religious behavior, and the religious and
cultural history of the jurisdiction.
Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of this Article, a proper
application of the “reasonable observer” or “endorsement” test might
demand consideration of the nature of the specific jurisdiction under the
government at issue. It remains somewhat of an open question whether
the “reasonable observer” is defined in relation to some sort of
nationwide average, or by the citizens of the specific town. But it seems
most likely that the answer should be something closer to the former. In
County of Allegheny, the Court hinted that the reasonable observer is
one who is familiar with the locality.193 Moreover, Justice Breyer, the
only justice voting with the majority in both McCreary County and Van
Orden (which were decided on the same day), explained that one factor
to consider is whether the display of the religious symbol had
historically garnered divisiveness among people in that locality.194 So, it
appears that, under the endorsement test, the nature of the jurisdiction
in which the display is erected matters.195
If that is so, then a locality might have a better chance of surviving
an Establishment Clause challenge than, say, the federal government.
Because the United States as a whole is more diverse than most
as well as of those who adhere to either of these religions, ibid., the constitutionality of its
effect must also be judged according to the standard of a ‘reasonable observer’ . . . .”).
193 See id. (considering the impact the display would have on “residents of Pittsburgh”
specifically).
194 Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 702 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“As far as I
can tell, 40 years passed in which the presence of this monument, legally speaking, went
unchallenged (until the single legal objection raised by petitioner). And I am not aware of
any evidence suggesting that this was due to a climate of intimidation. Hence, those 40
years suggest more strongly than can any set of formulaic tests that few individuals,
whatever their system of beliefs, are likely to have understood the monument as
amounting, in any significantly detrimental way, to a government effort to favor a
particular religious sect, primarily to promote religion over nonreligion, to ‘engage in’ any
‘religious practic[e],’ to ‘compel’ any ‘religious practic[e],’ or to ‘work deterrence’ of any
‘religious belief.’ Schempp, 374 U.S., at 305 (Goldberg, J., concurring).”)
195 The Supreme Court on one occasion identified this approach favored by Justice
Breyer, but made a point to note (at least in a Free Exercise Clause context) that such an
approach does not appear to hold precedential weight. Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2259–60.
So, at least in funding cases in which a religious entity claims improper anti-religious
discrimination, the Court does not appear to be on the cusp of consistently adopting such
an approach.
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localities, a “reasonable observer,” as defined only by a locality’s
populace, would be more attuned to the culture and history of the
locality than a reasonable observer, as defined in reference to the
populace of the entire United States, would be attuned to any single
United States “culture” regarding religious symbols. So, an action of a
government over a more culturally homogenous locality would less
likely appear to be an improper establishment of religion than would
the same action taken by the federal government, or even a state.
Simply put, a nativity scene looks less like an establishment of religion
when displayed in a public park in a town where eighty percent of
households have their own nativity scenes, but looks more like an
establishment of religion when placed on the National Mall in
Washington, D.C., at the “center” of a nation that is more religiously
diverse.
The Supreme Court’s analysis in Town of Greece exemplifies this
principle as well, even if unintentionally. There, the Court upheld a
town’s practice of opening town meetings with a prayer from local
Christian clergy that was often sectarian in nature.196 Among the
reasons the Court gave for why this practice did not violate the
Establishment Clause was that the religious makeup of the town itself
was heavily Christian.197 Because the town was so heavily Christian,
the Court implied, the fact that the prayers were largely Christian did
not establish a religion; it only reflected the town’s demographics.198
Presumably, then, the case might have turned out differently had it
centered on the United States Congress opening sessions with only
Christian prayers, because the United States overall is not as heavily
Christian as the town of Greece.199
Here is the overall point: the way the Supreme Court has analyzed
Establishment Clause challenges does not foreclose considering the
nature of the government actor and relevant governed jurisdiction.
Although the Court has not formally recognized such a consideration,

Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 570.
Id. at 585 (“The town made reasonable efforts to identify all of the congregations
located within its borders and represented that it would welcome a prayer by any
minister or layman who wished to give one. That nearly all of the congregations in town
turned out to be Christian does not reflect an aversion or bias on the part of town leaders
against minority faiths.”).
198 Id.
199 The Court in Town of Greece did not signal that sectarian Christian prayers would
be problematic even in Congress. But it did explain that Congress brings in ministers of
various faiths to deliver prayers. Id. at 578–79. So, if Congress did what the town of
Greece did and nearly all the prayers were specifically Christian, the analysis might be
different.
196
197
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such facts can (and I think must) factor into the Courts’ analyses. Local
governments are closer to the people they govern, and so, are generally
more likely to reflect the cultural and religious mores of that populace
than the national government or state governments. That being so, a
local government action with religious significance is less likely to be a
harmful “establishment” of religion contrary to the mores of the
populace and more likely to reflect a culture that will at times express
its deep convictions through the arm of government. So, to answer the
question posed in the introduction—should a mayor’s Thanksgiving Day
proclamation that specifically gives thanks to Jesus be treated the same
as a similar proclamation by the President of the United States?—
probably not.
B. The Remedies-Based Remedy
Now that I have explained why the substance of the Supreme
Court’s religion jurisprudence does not foreclose an inquiry into the
“level” of the government actor, I will next explain why Courts should
also prefer certain remedies over others when considering challenges to
local government action under the religion clauses, and how existing
doctrine can support them in doing so. First, courts should adhere
closely to the preference for as-applied challenges instead of facial
challenges when a religion clause claim is brought against a local
government. Second, in such situations courts should prefer
individualized remedies over broader injunctions. By following both of
these principles, courts could further the discretion of local
governments over religion that this Article claims is desirable while
adhering to the foundational principles of the law of remedies.
1. Favoring As-Applied Challenges
The Supreme Court has explained on several occasions that when a
law is challenged on federal constitutional grounds, courts should tend
toward resolving the lawsuit as an as-applied challenge instead of a
facial challenge.200 That directive should be followed vigorously when a
local government action is the target of the constitutional challenge.
Courts that do so respect the value of local government discretion while
also securing the essential rights of citizens most harmed by local
government actions that affect religion.

200

See infra note 207.
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In many constitutional cases, the Roberts Court has emphasized its
preference for as-applied challenges over facial challenges.201 Whereas
an as-applied challenge asks only whether a law or other government
action improperly infringes on the constitutional rights of the individual
claimant or claimants, a facial challenge typically contests the
government action in all its possible applications.202 A government
action is therefore facially unconstitutional only if there is no
conceivable application of that action that is permissible under the
Constitution.203 Such a showing is obviously more difficult for a
claimant to make than a showing that the government action is
unconstitutional as applied.204 And courts, in their remedial discretion,
may avoid even considering the facial validity of a government action
when a plaintiff could succeed on the more limited as-applied theory.
The rationale behind this approach is somewhat similar to that of the
constitutional-avoidance theory of statutory interpretation. Under that
theory, or “canon,” if a court is tasked with interpreting an ambiguous
statutory provision and one permissible reading of the provision might
make the statute unconstitutional, the court will gravitate toward
another permissible reading of that provision that does not render the
provision constitutionally problematic.205 Such an approach, some
would say, is one of judicial restraint. It allows as much action of the
legislative branch to remain in place as possible, under the assumption
that a legislature would prefer to have a potentially less-robust version
of its statute stay on the books than have no valid statute at all.206
Likewise, the preference for as-applied challenges is an exercise of
judicial restraint. It essentially says that courts should not decide more
201 Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts Court, 36
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 773, 775–83 (2009); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007);
Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. 320, 328–29 (2006).
202 Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 657, 657 (2010).
203 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (“A facial challenge to a
legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would
be valid.”).
204 Id.
205 N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 500 (1979) (“In a number of
cases the Court has heeded the essence of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s admonition
in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118, 2 L. Ed. 208 (1804), by holding that
an Act of Congress ought not be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible
construction remains available.”).
206 See, e.g., id. at 500–01 (explaining that the Court looks for a clear expression of
Congress’s intent before construing an ambiguous statutory provision in a way that would
render the provision problematic under the Constitution).
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than they need to decide.207 Thus, if the dispute between the individual
plaintiff and the government actor can be resolved by addressing only
the effect of the government’s action on that individual, then the court
need not consider the effect of the government action on additional
hypothetical individuals not before the court.
Assuming the presumption for as-applied challenges is warranted at
least in some cases, it is especially warranted when the government
action challenged was performed by a local government and implicates
religion. Local government actions more likely reflect the preferences of
a greater percentage of that jurisdiction’s constituents than do actions
of larger governments.208 Again, consider an example like the one
provided in Part I that involved Cities A, B, C, and D. Because of the
greater diversity of the United States as a whole, a federal law striking
a particular balance between the general public interest and the
religious freedom of people of faith may only be in accordance with
roughly half of the populace’s preferences (if not less).209 But because
local populaces are often more homogenous based on a variety of
characteristics, including convictions related to issues like religious
exemptions, an action taken by local government officials will more
likely satisfy a greater percentage of the local citizenry.210
That being so, a court decision invalidating an entire law or program
at the local level is likely to be more counter-majoritarian than a
similar decision related to a federal or state law or program. Although a
decision holding, for example, that a federal government action is
facially invalid may displease roughly half of citizens, a decision holding
a local government decision facially invalid would likely displease a
greater percentage of that populace. Compound that individual result
with similar decisions against thousands of localities across the nation,
and the overall result is significantly more counter-majoritarian on the
whole than a decision invalidating a federal action.

207 Ayotte, 546 U.S. at 328–29 (“Generally speaking, when confronting a constitutional
flaw in a statute, we try to limit the solution to the problem. We prefer, for example, to
enjoin only the unconstitutional applications of a statute while leaving other applications
in force . . .”); see also Kreit, supra note 202, at 658 (explaining that “the law strongly
favors as-applied challenges on the grounds that they are more consistent with the goals
of resolving concrete disputes and deferring as much as possible to the legislative
process”).
208 This is true because, as explained in part II.B, supra, localities are typically more
responsive to citizens’ desires than larger governments, and local populations tend to be
more homogenous. See also Blank, supra note 103, at 389–90.
209 See supra part II.B.
210 See supra part II.B.
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Of course, the holders of the minority view on church-state matters
within a particular locality should not be ignored. A preference for asapplied challenges indeed would not ignore such people. It would still
address the liberty interest asserted by the people who bring a claim.
From an economic standpoint, then, as-applied challenges are better
approximations of “weighted preferences”—those who are most
displeased or harmed by a local government action are those who are
more likely to bring a suit challenging the action.211 So, as-applied
challenges can still provide relief to the individuals whose interests
have been most harmed, all the while respecting local communities’
ability to express their values through local government action.
It is not difficult to understand how the preference for as-applied
challenges works when a claimant brings an action under the Free
Exercise Clause. The court would prefer to consider whether the
government action infringes on that claimant’s right to freely exercise
her religion, and avoid any unnecessary consideration of whether the
government action infringes on religious exercise as a general rule.212
But applying the preference for as-applied challenges is trickier with an
Establishment Clause challenge. What does it mean to ask whether a
government action improperly establishes religion as applied to the
claimant? I will give what I think is the best answer available under
existing doctrine.
The difficulty in answering whether and how an Establishment
Clause challenge could be evaluated “as applied” lies in a longstanding
debate centered around one important question: what governmentcaused harms should the Establishment Clause prevent?213 By

211 Of course, this is not a perfect measure. Many people who are frustrated or harmed
by a government action will not bring a lawsuit for a variety of personal reasons such as
finances, time, and reputation.
212 A request for a judicial exemption from a law is essentially an as-applied challenge.
213 Some, like Justice Clarence Thomas, see the Establishment Clause as a protection
for states to maintain their own establishments of religion without federal interference.
See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment). The majority of scholars and commentators see the clause as a protector
of individual liberty, but they disagree as to what harms it protects against. See, e.g., Alex
Geisinger & Ivan E. Bodensteiner, An Expressive Jurisprudence of the Establishment
Clause, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 77, 79 (2007) (explaining that one view holds that the
Establishment Clause secures freedom of thought and expression for individuals); Fallon,
supra note 178, at 90 (explaining that the Establishment Clause protects the right “(a) not
to be taxed to support religion, (b) not to be classified and unreasonably disadvantaged on
the basis of religion, (c) not to be symbolically demeaned or marginalized by governmental
endorsement of religion, or coerced into participating in a religious exercise, and (d) not to
be subjected to governmentally sponsored religious instruction or endorsement as an
aspect of public education.”).
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incorporating the Establishment Clause against state and local
governments, the Supreme Court has in effect declared that the
Establishment Clause protects individual liberties in some way. As the
predominant theory goes, it was incorporated through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a process generally reserved only
for certain fundamental rights of individuals.214 Although many did,
and still do, question whether the framers of the Constitution would
have thought of disestablishment as an individual right,215 for the
purposes of this Article I will treat the incorporation of that provision as
a conclusive statement that it is indeed an individual-rights guarantee.
But in what way? With what individual harm is the clause concerned?
One potential answer is that an establishment of religion could harm
the religious entities favored by the “establishing” action because that
action entangles government with religion. But if that is the answer,
then presumably such a religious entity would be the one bringing the
suit, and that rarely is the case. Another possibility is that anyone who
is not affiliated with the religious interests “established” by the
government is harmed by being treated less favorably than others
based on her religious beliefs (or lack thereof). But if that is the
interest, then it is not clear how the claim would differ in structure
from a Free Exercise Clause claim.216 And if it is similar to a
free-exercise claim, then addressing the claim as an as-applied
challenge is more straightforward. Finally, perhaps the harm the
Establishment Clause guards against is a conscience-based harm to
taxpayers;217 citizens may strenuously object to any of their tax dollars
being used to support a religious interest or viewpoint with which they
disagree. If that is the interest, then, again, the claim would operate
similarly to a free exercise claim in structure, and it would be relatively
easy for a court to address whether the government action violates a
constitutional right as applied to the individual claimant or claimants.
So, although there are some conceptual ambiguities regarding how a
court can prefer as-applied challenges even in Establishment Clause
cases, it appears that doing so would not be entirely inconsistent with
214 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 759–60 (2010) (describing the process of
selective incorporation of certain provisions of the Bill of Rights through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
215 See supra note 213.
216 Indeed, scholars have argued that the Establishment Clause constrains the
relationship between governments and citizens in a substantially similar way to the Free
Exercise Clause. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 178, at 1739–40 (noting that the clauses could
perhaps be treated as one, but favoring an approach that treats Establishment Clause
challenges as class-action-form Free Exercise challenges).
217 See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 178, at 90.
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the interests that clause aims to protect. All in all, courts that stick to
such a preference when a religion-related claim is brought against a
local government give more space to those governments to act for the
public health, safety, morals, and general welfare while staying within
federal constitutional bounds.
2. Favoring Narrow Individualized Remedies
Closely related to the preference for as-applied challenges is a
preference for certain remedies that give targeted relief to a wronged
claimant, but do not go further. To put it simply, this Article encourages
courts considering challenges to local government actions under the
religion clauses to favor narrower remedies like individualized
exemptions or damages instead of broad remedies like complete
invalidation of the relevant government action. Like with the
preference for as-applied challenges, courts that favor narrower
remedies give more space for local governments to chart their own
community-tailored course. And the rationale behind these remedies
supports such a preference.
This Article will focus on only a few categories of remedies: damages,
injunctions against enforcing a law against a complaining party, and
injunctions that invalidate a government action entirely. Courts should
favor the first two sorts of remedies when considering free-exercise or
establishment challenges to local government action.
In some types of free exercise cases,218 courts already favor a narrow
remedy that prevents enforcement of the government action against the
claimant, also known as an “exemption.” Picture a case in which a
government enacts a law or policy that appears neutral on its face, but
in its application might compel some people to act or not act contrary to
what their religious convictions dictate. For example, the federal
government might enact a law that generally requires certain
employers to include coverage for contraceptives in the health care plan
it provides to its employees; but some employers might claim that
supporting certain forms of contraception violates their religious
convictions.219 Or perhaps a local government zones an entire region for
residential use only, but a church that owns land in that area claims
that the zoning regulation violates its right to freely exercise its religion
because it does not allow it to host religious services and build and
operate a religious school on that property.

218 By this I mean to include not only cases brought directly under the Free Exercise
Clause, but also cases brought under statutes like RFRA and RLUIPA.
219 Such a situation is similar to the facts that gave rise to Burwell, 573 U.S. at 682.
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Let’s assume that a court agrees with the claimant in either of these
cases that the government action violates the claimant’s rights (perhaps
under a particular federal statute like RFRA or RLUIPA). The court
most likely will grant the claimant an exemption—decide that the
claimant has a right to not be subject to the government action. A
narrow, party-specific remedy like this comports with the goal of
allowing localities the discretion to chart their own policymaking
course. If an exemption to a local law or policy is granted, the law or
policy can still stand, and will continue to apply to anyone who does not
raise a successful claim for an exemption.220
Once again, though, the analysis is more complicated for an
Establishment Clause claim. Courts have long recognized the general
rule that a wronged party is not entitled to an equitable remedy when
an adequate remedy at law exists.221 Remedies at law are inadequate if
they, for example, will not prevent a claimant from being irreparably
harmed. Carrying these principles to the issue at hand, damages should
be the preferred remedy for local government Establishment Clause
violations.
Picture that a city establishes a program that uses local property tax
revenue to fund a voucher program that allows low-income households
to send children to private schools, which in that city includes almost
solely religious schools.222 A family with no religious affiliation sues the
city claiming the program is unconstitutional under the Establishment
Clause because it disproportionately allocates tax dollars to religious
institutions. Assuming a court agrees with the claimant that there is an
Establishment Clause problem, what should the court do?
One option is to invalidate the entire program. This option has some
intuitive appeal. If a program establishes religion, it establishes
religion, end of story; why would it matter who is harmed to what
degree?
That remedy is, in my view, more appropriate for problematic federal
government actions than it is for local actions. The reasons for this
distinction reflect the discussion in Part I.B. Action by the federal
government affects far more people than a city program. And the
220 The issue of whether such a narrower remedy is generally appropriate against a
federal or state government action, instead of a local action, is beyond the scope of this
Article. This Article simply asserts that narrow remedies are especially appropriate when
the government actor is a locality.
221 Monsanto Co. v. Geerston Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 156–57 (2010); Nat’l Private
Truck Council, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Com’n, 515 U.S. 582, 588 (1995) (explaining that
“Congress did not authorize injunctive or declaratory relief under § 1983 in state tax cases
when there is an adequate remedy at law”).
222 This scenario is somewhat similar to the facts in Zelman, 536 U.S. at 639.
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populace affected by a federal action is usually far larger and more
diverse. So, typically, a claimant that successfully challenges a federal
action will represent the interests of a much larger number and
proportion of the population than a claimant successfully challenging a
city action.
A court considering a remedy for a city’s problematic school voucher
program should think differently. If the injury the Establishment
Clause protects against is that of a claimant’s tax dollars supporting
religious interests with which the claimant disagrees, then damages
may be able to right the wrong. The locality could easily pay the
claimant the value of that claimant’s tax dollars that would have
otherwise gone to the voucher program.
A court could approach the remedies issue in a similar way if faced
with a city’s problematic religious display (like a Ten Commandments
display). If the city spends taxpayer dollars to erect or maintain the
display, then a claimant who objects to the display on Establishment
Clause grounds could be at least partially “made whole” by damages
equal to the amount of that claimant’s tax dollars that would have gone
toward that end.
This approach does invite an objection: what if the interest the
Establishment Clause protects is not only based on an objection to
where a claimant’s tax money is directed, but also based on the feeling
of offense the claimant might experience because of the existence of the
government program or display? Assuming a claimant has standing to
bring a claim based on such a ground, damages may still be a
reasonable remedial approach. In tort cases, for example, courts and
juries often are tasked with approximating the value of non-economic
harms, such as pain-and-suffering damages.223 If such an approach can
provide some meaningful compensation to a person who has gone
through tort-induced trauma, then perhaps it could work for a
constitutional harm too.
One might respond that these harms are meaningfully different in
nature: a classic tort is a one-off deal—one past event determines the
damages. But an active program or a standing display that supports
religion is an ongoing harm—it continues to offend the claimant for as
long as it exists. First, a court or jury could still provide damages for
prospective pain and suffering.224 They do so in tort cases in which a

223 C.V. Venters, Annotation, Instructions Regarding Measurement of Damages for
Pain and Suffering, 85 A.L.R. 1010 (1933) (providing an overview of many jurisdictions
that allow juries to calculate pain-and-suffering damages).
224 C.S. Wheatley, Jr., Future Pain and Suffering as Element of Damages for Physical
Injury, 81 A.L.R. 423 (1932) (explaining the general rule that future pain-and-suffering
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plaintiff, for example, is faced with years ahead of living with a
particular debilitating injury. If courts or juries can find a way to
quantify the harm of not getting to play sports with friends for the next
twenty years or more, it is not illogical to think they could also
satisfactorily quantify the harm of, for example, being periodically
reminded that a statue of Saint Peter indefinitely stands in the city
park.
Second, remedial principles from property law could provide a helpful
analytical framework that supports narrower remedies for local
government action infringing on religion. Calabresi and Melamed’s
seminal article on entitlements and remedies in polluter cases explains
that under a “property rule,” a person harmed by another person’s use
of property, like a polluting activity, is entitled to a ceasing of the
harmful activity; under a “liability rule,” however, the offending party is
merely entitled to damages, and the offending party may continue the
conduct if it pays those damages.225 A liability rule, Calabresi and
Melamed’s framework dictates, should govern when transaction costs
are high.226 In other words, if it would cost a lot of money to organize
and gain approval from all persons potentially affected by a property
owner’s pollution, then the conflict should be resolved simply by a court
assigning a value to the harm and compelling the polluting party to pay
that amount to anyone injured.
I do not advocate for a system in which governments may always
violate the rights of citizens if they give those citizens some money. But
the rationale behind Calabresi and Melamed’s framework at least
carries some normative weight in the context of local government action
that implicates religion. In such situations, transaction costs are
probably high. To involve all potentially affected persons in a decision
about whether to pursue a course of government action that may either
help or hurt religious interests, a locality would probably at least have
to hold a referendum on the action. And, because not every citizen will
vote, it would probably have to expend even more effort and resources
than that to make sure that everyone gives consent to the government
action. A “liability rule” in the context of free-exercise and
damages are appropriate when the party seeking relief shows that it is sufficiently
probable she will experience such pain and suffering).
225 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (1972).
226 James E. Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: the
Cathedral in Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 451 (1995) (describing the “the
familiar piece of conventional wisdom that amounts to virtual doctrine: [w]hen
transaction costs are low, use property rules; when transaction costs are high, use liability
rules”).
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establishment challenges serves as an easier proxy for gaining such
approval from affected parties. Those who are most harmed by the
government action are those who are more likely to bring a lawsuit and
receive compensation.227
Indeed, the law regarding civil rights actions supports such a
remedial approach when local government action is challenged.
Although the Eleventh Amendment’s protection of state sovereign
immunity228 somewhat insulates states and state agencies from
damages actions, it does not similarly apply to insulate local
governments.229 Local governments’ status as “persons” for certain
purposes, including the increased capacity to commit a constitutional
tort as if they were an individual and not state actor,230 make them
well-suited to pay damages in constitutional cases conceived through a
liability rule lens.
Finally, in the context of religion, narrow remedies like damages or
exemptions may also serve to avoid absurd or undesirable policy
outcomes. Picture a city in which eighty percent of the residents favor,
and twenty percent oppose, a school voucher program that may
implicate the Establishment Clause. A person from the twenty percent
minority then brings a claim challenging the government action under
the Establishment Clause. If a judge holds for the plaintiff and
invalidates the entire program, what happens if that plaintiff
eventually moves to another town? The person potentially harmed by
the government action could no longer be harmed by it, but the program
is still dead. And the city could not resurrect it because of the past court
ruling. Compound this individual result among thousands of localities,
and the final picture is a network of bordering localities with
substantially the same policies instead of self-determining cities and
towns that can experiment with different solutions and express their
local communities’ unique mores.231 But if, instead, the challenge was

227 That principle may apply just as strongly to larger government like state or federal
governments. But, as this Article hopes to make clear, other policy reasons for applying
the principle and thus favoring damages are more compelling with local governments
than the others.
228 U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of
the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.”).
229 See, e.g., Lincoln Cty., 133 U.S. at 530–31.
230 Local governments, unlike states, are considered “persons” able to be sued for
constitutional torts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Monell v. Dept. of Social Servs. of City of New
York, 436 U.S. 658, 688–90 (1978).
231 See MCCONNELL, ET AL., supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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evaluated as-applied and the remedy was damages, then the claimant’s
rights would be respected and the popular government program could
continue.232
Indeed, and relatedly, such a compensatory system contributes
toward a Tieboutian ideal because it makes it more financially feasible
(even if minimally so) for the offended party to move elsewhere.233 It
turns the abstract offense felt by the claimant into a fungible resource,
thus giving her a boost if she would rather live in the next town over
where the government pursues more amenable goals. Opting for
damages, and narrower remedies in general, instead of broad
invalidation, thus directly serves at least two desirable ends: (1)
allowing local governments to differ from each other, expressing
community values and creating a mosaic of competing policy
approaches, and (2) putting harmed citizens in a better position to
choose a locality that suits their preferences. Courts’ remedial
discretion thus stands as a potential doctrinally justified way of
affording localities more leeway over matters of religion than that
afforded to their state and federal counterparts.
V. CONCLUSION
Governments asserting power over large geographic regions with
diverse populaces are not well-equipped to cater to people’s competing
preferences on matters implicating religious convictions. Disagreements
on whether and to what degree government should support,
accommodate, or suppress religious interests in the public sphere are,
as Professor Hills says, “reasonable and deep.” But the United States is
not only unique in its diversity; it also operates under a unique multitiered federalism. From the beginning of this nation and before, local
governments served as special settings for democratic involvement and
community expression. They exercised significant discretion and power
over their small and relatively homogenous populaces. They were not
simply arms of the state. Over time, American law largely forgot the
inherent powers and advantages of these communities and their selfestablished governing bodies. From a misunderstanding of the roots of
these entities’ political power, states have come to exercise complete
power over them.

232 This argument applies to other narrower remedies, like exemptions, as well. If a
person brought a free-exercise claim successfully and the court thus invalidated the local
law entirely, the law would be off the books even if the claimant moved elsewhere.
Localities again would be less able to chart their own courses.
233 See Tiebout, supra note 116.
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Yet, that inappropriate and contra-historical subjugation of local
governments need not flow through every vein of American law. At
least as a matter of federal constitutional law, nothing is stopping
courts from considering the nature of local governments when those
governments’ actions are challenged under the religion clauses.
Unfortunately, courts from the Supreme Court on down have not
explicitly allowed local governments discretion to exercise their
institutional strengths on matters of religion. They should. Local
governments are necessary avenues by which communities can identify
and reinforce their values. And such entities, because they are close to
their constituency, which is likely more homogenous than the nation as
a whole, will more likely choose courses of action that do not infringe on
the rights of citizens as severely as the actions of a government over a
larger jurisdiction. If the courts allow localities some discretion to make
such decisions, then a far greater portion of the nation’s citizens will be
governed by laws with which they agree. This could be a meaningful
step toward accommodating those deep-seated, values-based disputes
that seem to violently bubble to the surface every time the Supreme
Court considers a case implicating church-state relations.
Not only is such a system desirable, but the first steps of it are
immediately reachable. In many religion cases, courts apply a variety of
balancing tests. Even though courts applying such tests do not directly
discuss the significance of the type of government at issue, such
consideration fits fairly comfortably alongside the sorts of
considerations courts do sometimes weigh. And factoring in the local
nature of the government actor pushes the balance toward a finding
that the government action is less burdensome and more reasonable.
Beyond those substantive analyses in religion cases, courts also can
and should favor a certain approach to assigning a remedy when the
government actor is a locality. Specifically, when the challenged
government conduct was performed by a local government, courts
should strongly prefer as-applied challenges to facial challenges and
prefer narrow individualized remedies to broad remedies like total
invalidation of the government action. Following this approach respects
the constitutional rights of those with minority viewpoints, but enables
localities to maintain programs that generally serve the public good and
reflect the preferences and mores of the communities they represent.
A wide network of geographically and culturally unique localities is a
blessing to a massive and diverse nation. For church-state cases, courts
can and should tap into that resource.

